Jakarta, October 1965. After a failed coup attempt, the Indonesian army and its allies killed, tortured and imprisoned hundreds of thousands of Indonesians suspected of being communists, many of Chinese descent. Yet a British Foreign Office memo from December 1964 had already noted: “A premature PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia] coup may be the most helpful solution for the West – provided the coup failed.” Some historians view that memo as evidence of a broader Cold War strategy to provoke or portray the PKI as responsible and use that as a pretext for repression.
What happened in 1965
On the night of September 30, 1965, a group calling itself the “September 30 Movement” kidnapped and killed six senior Indonesian generals. Major General Suharto, then commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, and his allies quickly blamed the PKI and used the incident to justify mass persecution and killings. Historical research has cast doubt on the official narrative that the generals’ killings were a communist plot: a declassified November 1965 document recording a meeting between US Embassy staff and a Polish diplomat suggests the idea for the kidnappings may have originated outside the PKI.
Washington gave the army the green light
What followed was a coordinated campaign against the PKI supported by Western powers. The US, along with the UK and Australia, provided intelligence, military, financial and political assistance to the Indonesian army. Declassified documents obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act show Washington gave lists of alleged PKI members to the army, offered “assistance wherever we can,” and sought to “spread the story of the PKI’s guilt, treachery and brutality.” Historian Geoffrey B. Robinson, an expert on Western involvement in the killings, argues that without that encouragement the violence would not have reached the scale it did.
A broader Cold War pattern
Similar interventions affected countries across the globe during the Cold War — Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Angola, Vietnam, Congo, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran among them — often followed by dictatorships, military regimes or prolonged instability. Robinson says such interventions accelerated social and political conflict, generated mass violence and produced failed states, with consequences still visible today in places like Iran.
Are we seeing a new Cold War?
Sixty years on, Robinson and others see echoes of Cold War-era logic in some current US foreign-policy moves. The article notes that earlier this year US President Trump threatened Mexico and Colombia with military action, proposed annexing Greenland, and in January the US captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. It also reports that in February the US and Israel attacked Iran, killing its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In other examples, the US has considered classifying organized crime groups as “terrorists,” raising concerns in countries such as Brazil, where President Lula da Silva has voiced fears of US intervention. In March, President Trump said he might “do anything” with Cuba amid a humanitarian crisis linked to a US oil blockade.
Robinson argues the logic is familiar: a powerful state asserting it can use force to make other states behave, and he questions selectivity in targeting. He asks why, if the aim is to oppose bad governance, actions focus so heavily on certain countries while far-right governments or allies such as Israel or Russia face little comparable pressure.
No accountability in Indonesia
Six decades after the mass killings, Indonesia has seen little official reckoning. There has been no formal state apology, no criminal trials, and no official memorial for victims. Former President Joko Widodo termed the events “gross human rights violations” and “regrettable” but did not issue an official apology. Communism remains stigmatized and illegal: the PKI was outlawed in 1966 and Marxist or communist-linked organizations and ideologies are still banned. During his 32-year rule, Suharto shaped public memory — building monuments, influencing education and culture — and in 2025 he was declared a national hero by current President Prabowo Subianto. Robinson warns that when perpetrators write history, that history is predictably distorted.
Was it genocide?
Whether the 1965–66 killings constitute “genocide” is contested. Some scholars and organizations use the term, arguing the systematic persecution fits the category, while no national government has officially recognized it as such. The UN Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group — it excludes political groups. Robinson contends that, given the scale and nature of the killings and the fact most victims committed no crimes, the events resemble genocide and suggests the need to reconsider definitions or apply the term.
Keeping memory alive
The killings were never formally investigated by the UN; most research has come from independent scholars, journalists, survivors and civil society. Across Indonesia, groups maintain digital archives and informal memorials. On Bali, which suffered especially severe violence in 1965–66, the son of a victim created the Taman 65 memorial (“65 Park”) to contest official silence. Since 2007, families of survivors and victims have held a weekly silent protest in front of Jakarta’s Merdeka Palace demanding accountability and recognition. Robinson laments the Genocide Convention’s exclusion of political groups and argues that the scale and character of the 1965–66 violence justify considering it genocide.
Edited by: Sarah Hofmann, Algadri Muhammad and Brenda Haas