When the European Union adopted a regulation in late January requiring all natural gas imports from Russia to end by the close of 2027, Hungary and Slovakia were the only member states to vote against it — but the measure was adopted nonetheless.
Both countries depend heavily on Russian gas: Hungary receives the vast majority of its supplies from Russia, and Slovakia a substantial portion. After the regulation passed, both governments said they would challenge it in court. Hungary moved first, filing a legal challenge at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on February 2, arguing the EU breached its treaties in adopting the ban.
Budapest’s case rests on three main claims, according to Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó:
– The ban functions as a sanction, and sanctions under EU rules require unanimous approval.
– Decisions about a member state’s energy sources are a national competence, not an EU prerogative.
– The regulation jeopardizes Hungary’s energy security.
Hungary has a history of litigation against EU institutions: a dozen cases from Budapest are currently pending before the ECJ. The court has often ruled against Hungary, but some legal experts say this dispute could play out differently.
A central legal question is whether the ban is a trade policy measure or, effectively, a foreign-policy sanction. That distinction matters because EU sanctions require unanimity among all 27 member states. Treating the gas ban as a trade measure allowed the European Commission to push it through by qualified majority (at least 15 member states representing 65% of the EU population), bypassing objections from Hungary and Slovakia.
Critics note that previous sanctions — against Russia and other states such as Venezuela or Iran — were adopted unanimously, making it harder to argue the Commission’s approach is consistent with past practice. Viktor Szep, a European law scholar at the University of Groningen, told DW the Commission’s path looks legally vulnerable because prior sanctions were unanimous.
A key differentiator, supporters of the Commission say, is the intended duration. Sanctions are typically temporary responses designed to expire once the triggering conduct ends. The Russian gas import ban, by contrast, is meant to permanently reshape the EU’s energy sourcing. European Commissioner for Energy and Housing Dan Jørgensen said publicly that even if peace returns, the EU will not resume buying Russian gas. That permanency bolsters the Commission’s position that the measure falls within external trade policy rather than the sanctions framework.
Legal coherence across EU policies may also support the Commission’s argument: the ban can be seen as a logical extension of the EU’s sanctions regime into related external trade decisions. The Commission insists the regulation is legally sound and necessary to end what it calls Russian “energy blackmail,” and Commissioner Jørgensen has stated that all member states must implement the ban regardless of their vote.
Some analysts believe political considerations played a role: by using qualified majority voting, the EU avoided giving one state — in this case Hungary — a veto over a measure the majority wanted. Observers point to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s close ties with Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s history of blocking or delaying EU actions aimed at pressuring Russia. Warsaw-based analyst Agata Loskot-Strachota suggested the regulation was partly intended to limit Russia’s ability to exploit divisions within the EU.
If the ECJ ultimately rules in Hungary’s favor, the practical effects may be limited. The court often balances annulment against economic and legal stability; it has previously annulled EU measures while allowing their effects to remain temporarily in force to avoid disruption. By the time a final judgment emerges — a process that can take years — member states and companies will likely have implemented infrastructure changes and new contracts to phase out Russian gas. That means even a favorable ruling for Hungary might not lead to an immediate or total reversal of the ban’s impact.
For now, the regulation stands: EU member states are legally bound to stop buying Russian natural gas by the end of 2027, including Hungary and Slovakia. The ECJ’s eventual decision will test contested lines between trade policy and sanctions, and between EU competences and national sovereignty over energy choices.
Edited by: Aingeal Flanagan