In late January the European Union adopted a regulation requiring all natural gas imports from Russia to end by the close of 2027. Hungary and Slovakia were the only member states to vote against it, but the measure was passed by qualified majority and is binding on all members.
Hungary filed a challenge at the European Court of Justice on February 2, arguing the EU breached its treaties in adopting the ban. Budapest frames its case around three core claims, voiced by Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó: that the measure amounts to a sanction (which under EU rules requires unanimous approval); that decisions about a member state’s energy sources fall within national competence rather than EU competence; and that the regulation undermines Hungary’s energy security given its heavy dependence on Russian supplies.
Hungary already has many cases pending before the ECJ, and the court has frequently ruled against Budapest in the past. Still, some legal experts say this dispute raises distinctive questions that could produce a different result.
The central legal issue is classification: is the gas import ban an external trade policy measure the EU can adopt by qualified majority, or is it effectively a foreign-policy sanction that must be agreed unanimously by all 27 member states? The Commission advanced the rule under trade powers and secured enough votes to meet the qualified-majority threshold (at least 15 member states representing 65% of the EU population). Critics point out that earlier sanctions on Russia and other states were adopted unanimously, which opponents say makes the Commission’s route legally vulnerable. University of Groningen scholar Viktor Szep has noted the inconsistency with past practice.
Supporters of the Commission argue the measure’s intended permanence is decisive: unlike typical sanctions, which are temporary responses tied to specific conduct, the gas ban is meant to permanently reshape EU energy sourcing. European Commissioner for Energy and Housing Dan Jørgensen has said the EU will not resume buying Russian gas even if hostilities cease, and the Commission presents the regulation as a legally coherent extension of existing sanctions and trade policy aimed at ending what it describes as Russian “energy blackmail.”
Politics likely played a role as well. Using qualified majority prevented a single government from vetoing a policy the majority wanted, and observers note Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s close ties to Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s history of delaying EU measures targeting Russia. Some analysts suggested the regulation was partly designed to reduce Russia’s ability to exploit divisions within the bloc.
Even if the ECJ rules in Hungary’s favor, practical consequences may be limited. The court has sometimes annulled measures while allowing their effects to remain temporarily in place to avoid market and legal disruption. By the time a final judgment is reached — a process that can take years — member states and energy companies may already have reworked contracts and infrastructure to eliminate Russian gas, limiting any immediate reversal.
For now the regulation stands: EU member states, including Hungary and Slovakia, are legally bound to stop buying Russian natural gas by the end of 2027. The ECJ’s eventual ruling will test contested boundaries between trade policy and sanctions, and between EU competence and national sovereignty over energy choices.