After Israel launched “preemptive strikes” against Iran on Saturday and President Donald Trump announced that “major combat operations” by the US were underway, Trump said the campaign’s aim was to “defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime,” vowing to destroy Iranian nuclear and military capabilities. “We will ensure Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon,” he said, and added goals to obliterate Iran’s ballistic missile program and its naval forces. Analysts say the US–Israel campaign does not look short or limited; it could continue for weeks or months.
Objective 1: Stop Iran obtaining or building nuclear weapons
Following the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025, Trump declared that the US had “obliterated” Iran’s major nuclear facilities and that Tehran would not be able to build nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. But experts caution limits to what strikes can achieve. Marcus Schneider of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Lebanon says attacks set back Iran’s program by months or years but cannot eliminate it, because technical expertise and know‑how to build centrifuges and enrich uranium cannot be destroyed from the air. Shahin Modarres, a security analyst, argues a nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable to Israel and the US, so preventing weaponization is a strategic objective. Others, like Diba Mirzaei of GIGA, call the nuclear argument a pretext, saying no immediate practical danger is evident. Recent US–Iran talks in Geneva over Tehran’s nuclear program produced no breakthrough.
Objective 2: Obliteration of Iran’s ballistic missile program
Many analysts see Iran’s missile capabilities as at least as concerning as its nuclear work. Iran demonstrated during the previous conflict that its missiles could damage Israeli and US facilities in the region. Modarres notes production facilities, storage sites, and supply chains (including solid-fuel procurement) are targetable, so recent strikes can degrade missile infrastructure. But he stresses technological know‑how survives, so complete eradication is unlikely; severe degradation and long‑term limitation are possible. Schneider similarly emphasizes Iran’s domestic missile industry: arsenals can be destroyed, but rebuilding capacity and timeframes, and collateral consequences, complicate the picture.
Objective 3: Destruction of Iran’s naval forces
Destroying Iran’s navy is more militarily feasible than eliminating missiles, though not trivial. Schneider points to many small vessels, including speedboats, that complicate a quick campaign. Modarres recalls Operation Praying Mantis (1988) as precedent for heavy US action against Iran’s navy; if Iran threatens freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Washington could justify large-scale naval operations to keep sea lanes open. Sara Kermanian of the University of Sussex says the US could severely damage Iran’s active naval forces in the short term, significantly reducing their capacity to disrupt maritime traffic.
Objective 4: Toppling the regime
Trump has suggested that weakening Iran’s leadership could pave the way for regime change, urging Iranians to seize a chance for government takeover. But how Washington intends to achieve regime collapse without ground forces is unclear. Modarres says renewed mass protests are possible but would likely require a powerful triggering event; spontaneous uprising is unlikely given the memory of repression unless the regime is structurally weakened. Schneider argues that expecting airpower and external pressure alone to prompt a popular uprising and remove the regime is unrealistic—toppling the government would probably require ground troops and a much longer war, raising questions about regime resilience. Trump’s reported offers of immunity to some IRGC members aim to encourage elite defection; Modarres calls this a classic strategy that might gain traction only if sustained military and economic pressure fragments regime cohesion fundamentally.
What if regime collapse is not achieved?
If the campaign fails to produce regime change, consequences for ordinary Iranians could be severe. Kermanian warns a wounded but intact state may intensify repression, especially if it sees parts of society as having welcomed external pressure. Outcomes would depend on whether escalation leads to a negotiated settlement that restructures relations or whether confrontation drags on through cycles of sanctions, proxy conflict, and periodic strikes. Without settlement, Iran could enter prolonged militarization and deeper economic attrition.
Additional reporting by Niloofar Gholami and Kersten Knipp.
Edited by: Ole Tangen Jr.