In German politics the rule has long been clear: no cooperation with the far right. The “Brandmauer” — the firewall against the populist AfD — remains a red line at the national level. But in Brussels and Strasbourg a larger question is taking shape: does Europe’s center-right still seek to isolate the far right, or is it increasingly using it to secure majorities and pass legislation when convenient?
The question gained urgency after reports that lawmakers from the European People’s Party (EPP), the dominant center-right force in the European Parliament, coordinated with far-right groups ahead of votes on migration policy, including proposals for so-called “return hubs” — deportation centers outside the EU. The reports suggest not only that the far right voted with the center-right, but that there may have been prior contact, negotiated wording and efforts to build a joint majority.
Nicolai von Ondarza, an expert on EU institutions at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), says this points to a structural change in how the Parliament functions. He argues the EU is moving toward something resembling a minority government in the European Parliament, where the EPP increasingly chooses between two majority options: the traditional pro‑European coalition with Socialists and Liberals, or a majority that includes parties to its right. He stresses that more than 80% of decisions are still carried by the mainstream pro‑European majority, but the crucial shift is that alliances with the right are no longer taboo. “It is still the exception, but an exception that is occurring more frequently,” he says.
Sophia Russack, a research fellow at CEPS in Brussels, goes further, calling this “the new normal.” She notes a stark contrast in reactions: Germany still treats cooperation with the far right as scandalous, whereas elsewhere in Europe such cooperation provokes less shock. Russack highlights the difference between accidental overlap in voting and active cooperation. The EPP has long argued it cannot stop far-right parties from voting the same way, but Ondarza and Russack point to evidence of deliberate coordination: drafting amendments to secure far-right support and negotiating in advance to assemble majorities.
That distinction matters because it changes the political meaning of alliances. The European Parliament lacks the clear government‑opposition binary of many national legislatures; majorities are built file by file. If legislation is crafted with far-right backing in mind, or if parties actively negotiate with them before votes, the relationship moves from incidental to strategic.
Short-term, this strategy can strengthen the EPP by giving it flexibility to choose partners on either side. The 2024 European elections altered parliamentary arithmetic and expanded the center-right’s room to maneuver. But Ondarza warns of costs. Practically, frequent cooperation with the far right may erode the willingness of Socialists and Liberals to work with the EPP on issues where their support remains necessary, making EU policy less stable and more unpredictable. Politically, normalizing the far right as a partner may empower forces that aim to reshape the EU’s political character, undermining liberal and pluralist norms.
There is also a danger conservatives may miscalculate: by borrowing far-right support to achieve short-term gains, mainstream parties could be strengthening a rival that might one day supplant them. In blunt terms, they risk sidelining themselves.
Russack underscores how cooperation increases the far right’s legitimacy. These parties have long had seats, speaking time and publicity in Brussels and Strasbourg; what is changing is their ability to shape outcomes. She points to migration as an area where language and policy once deemed politically unacceptable have been adopted by the center-right. If the far right becomes a dependable source of support, it gains leverage over terms, priorities and the boundaries of acceptable policy across multiple dossiers.
Both experts emphasize that this trend remains limited for now: most legislation still flows from the mainstream pro‑European majority. Yet the growing willingness to draft laws with far-right backing, or to negotiate with those parties in advance, signals a notable shift in parliamentary practice and political calculation. Whether this becomes a durable realignment or a tactical phase with unforeseen consequences will shape the future balance of power and the character of European politics.
Edited by: Jess Smee
