The nuclear threat in the Middle East has clearly intensified since the conflict began in late February, when the US and Israel struck targets in Iran. Nuclear sites in both Iran and Israel have been hit during the fighting, raising fears about escalation and regional proliferation.
US President Donald Trump framed the campaign as aimed at stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. But many experts warn that such strikes could have the opposite effect, pushing regional actors toward nuclear options rather than deterring them.
Nuclear weapons are traditionally viewed as deterrents: possessing them is supposed to make states less vulnerable to attack. Observers often point to North Korea, whose arsenal many believe has made direct intervention against the regime extremely risky. By contrast, Ukraine’s decision in 1994 to relinquish what was then the third-largest nuclear arsenal—based on security assurances from Russia, the US and the UK—has been reinterpreted since Russia’s 2022 invasion as an example of how giving up nuclear capabilities can leave a state vulnerable.
Before the war, Iran was widely described as being in a state of “nuclear latency”: it had much of the technical capacity to build a weapon but had not done so. Some analysts say Tehran maintained deliberate ambiguity to avoid provoking pre-emptive strikes, and that recent attacks may have turned an unfinished program into a political grievance that increases incentives to pursue harder nuclear options. Iranian officials have even raised the possibility of withdrawing from the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which has 191 parties and aims to limit the spread of nuclear arms.
Shifts in regional security caused by the conflict could prompt other Middle Eastern states to reconsider their nuclear posture. Gulf states feel squeezed between the ambitions of Iran and Israel and have lost some confidence in US security guarantees. According to Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association, this environment will push some Gulf capitals closer to contemplating nuclear weapons, though immediate dash-for-the-bomb scenarios are unlikely because of substantial technical, political and logistical hurdles.
Saudi Arabia has already taken steps toward nuclear latency. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly said that if Iran develops a bomb, Saudi Arabia would need one as well. After a US visit in late 2025, Saudi Arabia reportedly secured a nuclear cooperation agreement allowing uranium enrichment. That deal—if it proceeds—would require congressional approval in Washington. Many nuclear cooperation agreements the US signs include the IAEA’s “additional protocol,” which grants enhanced inspection authority; reports suggest the Saudi arrangement might instead rely on a more limited bilateral safeguards agreement, raising proliferation concerns. A former IAEA official has described such flexibility as undermining the rationale for striking Iran to prevent enrichment.
Even so, building a weapons capability would take Saudi Arabia many years—analysts estimate a decade or more to develop effective nuclear power infrastructure, and longer to weaponize—while shortages of trained personnel and industrial capacity pose further limits. Riyadh appears, for now, focused on civilian nuclear energy and prestige as much as weaponization.
The United Arab Emirates already operates the Barakah nuclear power plant under a 2009 agreement with the US that included the additional protocol and a commitment to forgo enrichment. The UAE’s deal also contains a “most-favored nation” clause allowing renegotiation if neighboring states obtain more permissive terms—an element that could spur political pressure if Gulf peers secure looser arrangements.
Other regional candidates for nuclear latency include Egypt and Turkey. Egypt is constructing a Russian-supported reactor on the Mediterranean coast but faces financial and political constraints that make an arms program unlikely in the near term. Turkey is expanding civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia and China and is improving its domestic defense industry; as a NATO member, Turkey also benefits from alliance security guarantees, reducing the incentive to pursue nuclear weapons.
On the global level, China and Russia have strategic reasons not to see the non-proliferation regime collapse entirely, especially because proliferation risks would complicate their own security environments in East Asia. While Moscow and Beijing might supply materials or technology that could help civilian nuclear programs, experts argue they are unlikely to overtly assist weaponization. At the same time, divisions between Western states and Russia/China could be exploited by regional actors seeking to minimize diplomatic fallout if they move closer to the nuclear threshold.
Preventing wider proliferation in the post-conflict Middle East will be difficult. Experts emphasize that regional security dialogue is the most realistic route to reduce incentives for nuclear armament. Renewed diplomatic engagement, confidence-building measures and cooperative security arrangements would be necessary to dissuade states from concluding that only nuclear deterrents can protect them from adversaries or further attacks.
In short, the war has increased the risk that states in the Middle East will reconsider their civil and military nuclear options. Significant technical, political and time barriers mean an immediate arms race is unlikely, but altered security perceptions, contentious nuclear agreements, and fractured alliances could make nuclear latency and eventual proliferation more probable over the longer term.