US President Donald Trump has signaled a desire for a swift end to the conflict in Iran even as American military forces and equipment gather around the Persian Gulf. Tehran has continued to choke off a substantial portion of global energy flows by disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump and Israeli officials have insisted that weeks of airstrikes have heavily degraded Iran’s conventional forces — the US has reported roughly 13,000 targets struck since February 28, while Israeli statements claim around 80% of Iranian air defenses were neutralized.
The strikes have reportedly killed senior regime figures, including former supreme leader Ali Khamenei, and observers say Mojtaba Khamenei appears to have succeeded him despite not being seen publicly. Even after those blows, Iran has mounted counterstrikes and organized a defensive response. Analysts say Tehran’s conventional capabilities are badly damaged, but its long-standing asymmetric doctrine lets it remain a resilient and dangerous actor.
Roots of the asymmetric approach
Iran’s asymmetric strategy traces back to the post-1979 arms embargo and the brutal 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. Cut off from advanced foreign weapons, Tehran invested in improvised, locally produced systems and in cultivating regional proxies. Over decades those practical workarounds coalesced into an operational doctrine focused on low-cost, widely distributed tools — missiles, attack drones, cyber capabilities and militia networks — coordinated largely by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Funding from continued energy sales to buyers willing to bypass sanctions, plus long-term planning and dispersed production, means Iran can sustain asymmetric operations far longer than its battered conventional forces alone would indicate.
Drones, cost asymmetry and production resilience
A central element of Iran’s campaign is inexpensive, one-way attack drones, notably the Shahed family. Unit costs for these drones are estimated in the tens of thousands of dollars, with ranges approaching 2,000 km for some variants. Tehran has launched thousands of such drones since the fighting began, often in conjunction with pricier ballistic missiles to try to saturate defenders. Most drones are intercepted, but a fraction penetrate defenses and have caused lethal damage — including an attack on a US base in Kuwait that killed six service members.
The economics work in Iran’s favor. Defenders often must use very expensive interceptors — for example $4 million Patriot missiles — against targets that cost only a few tens of thousands of dollars, imposing an unsustainable exchange rate. Iranian production is decentralized, built from many dual-use components and capable of being assembled in small workshops. Reports that some Russian-made variants may appear in Iranian inventories further complicate efforts to estimate resupply rates.
Geography and control of the Strait of Hormuz
Geography is another asymmetric advantage. The narrow Strait of Hormuz handles about 20% of global seaborne oil shipments; its closure is therefore a potent lever. Iran can threaten tankers with drones, naval mines and fast-attack craft while using coastal terrain and littoral defenses for cover. Recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf have underlined that vulnerability.
Forcing the strait open by military means would be extremely challenging. Analysts say securing continuous, safe shipping would likely require tens of thousands of ground forces to seize and hold wide stretches of coastline and maritime facilities — a task that would likely spark persistent insurgency and carry enormous costs in troops, casualties and money. That makes a purely military fix unlikely without a broader political settlement.
Domestic politics and external calculations
Inside Iran, the regime’s priority appears to be survival. In the United States there is little public or political appetite for a massive ground invasion, and market pressures, international allies and the costs of escalation all push Washington toward de-escalation and negotiation. While Trump has suggested Iran may seek talks, Tehran’s remaining leaders publicly deny willingness to negotiate directly; Iran’s sitting president has warned the US that confrontation will be costly and futile.
Taken together — cheap, reproducible weaponry, proxy networks, and the ability to menace global energy routes via Hormuz — most experts judge that Iran can maintain a credible asymmetric threat for an extended period. If Tehran’s goal is to preserve a recurring, low-level capability to disrupt shipping and signal leverage, it is likely able to do so for the foreseeable future.
Implications for military and political options
A rapid, conclusive military victory that forces immediate regime change in Tehran therefore looks unlikely without committing to a protracted, casualty-heavy ground campaign or achieving a significant political settlement. Absent such an outcome, expect continued pressure on maritime traffic, intermittent missile and drone strikes, and enduring instability in the region until a negotiated resolution is reached.
Edited by: Darko Janjevic