US President Donald Trump has signaled he wants a quick end to the war in Iran even as US military assets mass around the Persian Gulf, where Tehran continues to choke off a substantial share of the world’s energy supply by blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Trump has said “regime change has occurred” and that the US is “on track to fulfill all its objectives very soon.” He and Israel claim weeks of airstrikes have heavily degraded Iran’s conventional navy, air force, large weapons systems and defense production — with US strikes said to have hit roughly 13,000 targets since February 28 and Israeli statements that about 80% of Iranian air defenses have been destroyed.
Despite severe losses among the regime’s senior leadership and security apparatus — including the death of former supreme leader Ali Khamenei in the first strikes on Tehran and the apparent succession by his son Mojtaba, who has not been seen publicly — Iran has continued to launch counterstrikes and coordinate a defense. Analysts say Tehran’s conventional capabilities have been battered, but its asymmetric warfare doctrine, developed over decades, allows it to remain a durable threat.
Origins of Iran’s asymmetric doctrine
Iran’s asymmetric strategy has roots in the post-1979 arms embargo and the experience of the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. Faced with isolation and scarce access to high-end systems, Tehran invested in improvised, indigenously produced capabilities and proxy networks. Over time those improvisations evolved into a coherent doctrine centered on low-cost, distributed systems — missiles, drones, cyber tools and regional militias — overseen and proliferated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Those capabilities have been financed in part by continuing energy exports to customers willing to circumvent sanctions. That funding and long-term preparation mean Iran can sustain asymmetric operations longer than its degraded conventional forces alone would suggest.
Drones, cost asymmetry and production
A central pillar of Iran’s current campaign is its cheap, one-way attack drone family, notably the Shahed series. With estimated unit costs between $20,000 and $50,000 and ranges up to about 2,000 km, these drones are relatively inexpensive to produce and field in large numbers. Tehran has fired thousands of such drones since the conflict began, often paired with more expensive ballistic missiles to try to overwhelm air defenses. Most Shaheds are shot down, but a fraction get through, and some strikes have had deadly consequences — including an attack on a US base in Kuwait that killed six service members.
The economics favor Iran: using high-cost interceptors such as $4 million Patriot missiles against low-cost drones imposes an unsustainable price ratio on the defender. Iranian drone production is distributed, uses largely dual-use components, and can be assembled in small workshops. Reports that Russian-manufactured variants may appear in Iranian stocks complicate estimates of how quickly Iranian inventories can be replenished.
Geography and the Strait of Hormuz
Iran’s second major advantage is geography. The narrow Strait of Hormuz is the sea lane for roughly 20% of global oil exports; its blockage is a powerful strategic lever. Iran can threaten tanker traffic with drones, naval mines and fast attack craft, using coastal terrain for cover. Recent attacks on civilian vessels in the Gulf underline that threat.
Opening the strait by force would be extraordinarily difficult. Analysts argue that ensuring safe, continuous shipping would require tens of thousands of ground forces to seize and hold extensive shoreline and maritime infrastructure, likely provoking an enduring insurgency and enormous costs in troops, casualties and money. That makes a purely military solution to restore normal traffic unlikely without a broader political settlement.
Political calculations and survivability
Domestically, Iran’s regime appears primarily focused on survival. There is little appetite in the US for a large-scale ground war, and market and allied pressures create incentives for Washington to seek a de-escalation. Trump has suggested Iran seeks negotiations, while Tehran’s surviving leaders publicly deny direct talks. The incumbent Iranian president has warned the US that confrontation will be costly and futile.
Given the combination of cheap, reproducible systems, proxy networks, and the ability to threaten global energy flows via Hormuz, experts conclude Iran can sustain a credible asymmetric threat for an extended period. If Tehran’s strategic objective is simply to maintain a periodic, low-level capability to disrupt shipping and signal leverage, it likely can do so for the foreseeable future. A rapid, decisive military victory and swift regime change in Tehran therefore do not appear plausible without a costly, protracted ground campaign or significant political accommodation.
Edited by: Darko Janjevic