Over the six weeks of the United States and Israel’s war with Iran, NATO members have reacted unevenly. While some allies withheld support for military action or barred use of their facilities, the three Baltic states took a different stance, describing operation Epic Fury as understandable given Iran’s nuclear program, regional threats and its backing of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Latvia’s president Edgars Rinkevics and other Baltic leaders also welcomed the killing of Iran’s supreme leader in late February, seeing it as a potential opening for the Iranian people.
Estonia signaled readiness to consider sending demining vessels to the Strait of Hormuz. Lithuania said it might provide troops if Washington requested assistance. Lithuanian president Gitanas Nauseda framed this as reciprocal: the Baltic states accept the permanent presence of US forces on their soil and expect to be willing to support US-led international missions in turn. For the Baltics, backing the US is seen as vital to their security against Russia. Moscow has warned of “serious consequences” after accusing the three countries of allowing airspace use by drones attacking Russia—accusations the Baltics deny.
Since the Iran war began, the Baltic states have again presented themselves as model allies, noted alongside Poland and Gulf states by US defense officials. They were among the earliest to heed US calls to raise defense spending and remain leaders in NATO: in 2025 Poland spent 4.5% of GDP on defense, Lithuania 4%, Latvia 3.7% and Estonia 3.4%, compared with the US at 3.2%.
Observers describe the Baltic approach as an “established signature style”: staying on the right side of US priorities while avoiding actions that might draw negative attention from Donald Trump. The region has embraced deterrence by denial—making attack so costly and unachievable that an adversary will not attempt it—rather than deterrence by retaliation, which implied tolerance of partial occupation.
Trump’s past skepticism about defending NATO allies is not a surprise to many in the Baltics. A 2025 Latvian poll found only 43% believed NATO would fight for the country if attacked, while 41% doubted it. That uncertainty has driven the growth of national guards—volunteer defense forces intended to make occupation impossible. Latvian civic leaders emphasize that NATO’s security depends on member states themselves: “NATO is us,” in the words of a Transatlantic organisation official, underscoring the need to expand compulsory service, professional forces and national guard units.
Preparing for a possible reduced US role in NATO, Baltic policymakers are encouraging allied contingents from other countries to reinforce the region. Multinational forces are stationed across the Baltics: a Canadian-led brigade of roughly 2,000 in Latvia, a UK-led battlegroup of about 1,500 in Estonia, and Germany’s 45th Armored Brigade in Lithuania, currently some 1,800 troops with plans to grow to 4,800 military personnel and 200 civilian staff by 2027. Increasing those contingents is a diplomatic and military priority.
Beyond troop rotations, the Baltics are urged to fast-track defensive infrastructure upgrades—anti-tank obstacles, counter-drone systems and other measures—to harden territory in case US engagement in NATO diminishes and other allies focus inward. The argument is that if Washington scales back, the region must accelerate self-help and secure commitments from partners now, because later reallocation of resources and attention would leave little room to build the necessary defenses.