A war without clear justification. A president who threatens, “A whole civilization will die tonight.” For many observers, recent clashes involving the US, Israel and Iran mark another step in the deterioration of international relations. “We’re really at a low point in a rules-based order,” Stacie Goddard, a political science professor at Wellesley College, told DW.
The “rules-based order” generally refers to the set of norms and institutions established after World War II that gained renewed importance after the Cold War. “It is an order that is based on a number of rules, oftentimes defined as liberal rules, that are designed to create patterns and regulate international relations,” Goddard said. “The idea is to create a system that really constrained states and how they could behave towards each other.”
Objectives and downfalls
In the wake of two world wars, the aim was to foster a more stable, free and prosperous world. Bodies such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization were formed; member states accepted limits on aggression and a recognition of the right to self-defense after an attack.
Yet the liberal aspirations of the postwar order have never operated as universal or equal in practice. “There’s no doubt, at least in my mind, that the aspirations of the liberal order and the rules-based order were universal. But obviously, it never operates like that in reality. It’s exclusive. It’s hierarchical. The actions of many of its supporters, the US included, are hypocritical, taking advantage of the rules to the detriment of others,” Goddard said.
Many Global South countries have long felt the guardrails built by the West did little to benefit them. Amitav Acharya, a professor at American University and author of The Once and Future World Order, says there is a persistent sense in the Global South that “the rules are rigged against them. They did benefit to some extent, but they never really had agency. They never really got the place under the sun, so to speak.”
A commonly cited example is the International Criminal Court (ICC). African leaders and many human rights lawyers have accused the court of disproportionately targeting African figures: a 2024 Amnesty International report noted that of 54 individuals indicted by the ICC to date, 47 are African.
Erosion of the rules-based order
The past decade has further shaken confidence in the rules-based order. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 directly challenged the principle of sovereignty.
If the age of a rules-based order is indeed waning, what could follow?
Scenario 1: Hemispheric dominance
One discussed possibility is a return to hemispheric dominance. Some describe parts of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy as a modern “Donroe Doctrine,” echoing the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine that sought to curb European influence in the Americas. Today, references to such a doctrine suggest US attempts to assert dominance in its hemisphere, with examples cited like pressure on Venezuela and threats involving Greenland.
If superpowers carve the globe into spheres of influence, China might consolidate control over South Asia with consequences for Taiwan, while Russia could exert freer influence in eastern Europe. These outcomes are the darkest vision of hemispheric dominance — though many analysts view this scenario as less probable.
Goddard warns of major backlash from sovereign states unwilling to be assigned to another power’s sphere of influence. She also emphasizes that leaders such as Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump do not necessarily act solely in national interest, but often in ways that benefit themselves and their inner circles, leading to unpredictable and self-serving international behavior. Along these lines, Goddard and colleagues at Georgetown coined “neo-royalism” to describe a shift away from the rules-based order toward small elite networks that shape international politics to their own and their loyalists’ advantage.
Scenario 2: Multiplex instead of hegemonic
A contrasting possibility is a multipolar — or as Acharya prefers, a “multiplex” — world order. In a multiplex system, power is more widely distributed: not just a handful of great powers, but many actors including middle powers, regional leaders, non-state actors and civil society.
Cooperation would occur at global institutions like the UN and through regional arrangements. A multiplex world implies sharing ideas, know-how and norms across diverse actors. Middle powers would be particularly important; analysts often point to the EU, Indonesia in Southeast Asia or South Africa in Africa as examples of states that could shape regional and global outcomes.
Acharya notes that a multiplex order would not be perfect: conflict and instability would remain, but they would be less dominated by singular hegemonic rivalries.
Scenario 3: Total collapse?
A final, feared scenario is systemic collapse: chaos, anarchy and the possibility of another great war. Both Acharya and Goddard say such a complete breakdown is unlikely at present. People remember the costs of multiple intercontinental wars too clearly to willingly repeat them.
Goddard expects middle powers to remain pivotal. “What happens with the rules-based order depends on what happens with those who still feel it is valuable and who have some power to make things happen. To the extent they’re actually willing to push back against these other elements, even if pushing back is costly,” she said.
The trajectory of a new world order may hinge on whether the EU, Japan, South Korea, India and similar states pursue independent trade pacts, bolster military autonomy from the US, and simultaneously commit to rules-based principles. Their choices could help shape a post-Western-designed order that is more plural and inclusive.
Edited by: Chris Robinson, Don Mac Coitir