Iran’s nuclear program has long been a flashpoint, and terms like yellowcake, centrifuges, and enrichment have come to symbolize crisis and instability for many Iranians. The country’s insistence on continuing uranium enrichment has drawn heavy international sanctions and, according to some estimates, inflicted massive economic damage.
The recent rounds of military clashes and fragile ceasefires between Tehran and Washington have again put Iran’s nuclear stockpile at the center of international attention. Analysts believe Iran holds more than 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to roughly 60 percent, a level far above civilian reactor needs. At 60 percent, the material is already highly enriched and could, in theory, be pushed to weapons-grade concentrations of about 90 percent in a much shorter time than lower-enriched uranium.
US leaders have signaled different intentions for that material. Former US President Donald Trump has repeatedly described the remnants of Iran’s program after the June 2025 strikes in dismissive terms and has said the United States would take possession of the material. His public statements about how that would happen have varied, ranging from assurances that Iran agreed to hand over stockpiles to more vague remarks about US teams recovering material from damaged sites once a peace arrangement exists.
Iran has not confirmed any agreement to transfer uranium. Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, have said much of the material remains under rubble at damaged facilities and that Tehran currently has no program to recover it. At the same time, Iranian officials have not ruled out diluting highly enriched uranium as part of a negotiated deal under international supervision.
Reports have suggested Tehran might be willing to dilute some of its stockpile and send other portions to a third country for storage. Russian President Vladimir Putin has publicly offered Russia as a potential repository for enriched material. But key unknowns remain: where the material is precisely stored, how accessible it is after damage, and what technical and security hurdles any removal or transfer would involve.
Iran’s main nuclear sites — Isfahan, Fordow and Natanz — were hit during last year’s Operation ‘Midnight Hammer.’ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general has said most of the highly enriched uranium is likely still at the Isfahan complex. The IAEA reported that 18 containers, thought to carry about 200 kilograms of enriched uranium, were moved into a tunnel at Isfahan on June 9, 2025, days before the wider fighting began. Other observers have speculated some material could be at Fordow or even the Bushehr power plant.
Technical experts note that removal is feasible but complicated. Under strict IAEA supervision, enriched uranium can be packaged, transported and stored elsewhere, but doing so safely requires detailed procedures and specialized equipment. Underground storage facilities like Fordow make physical access harder, and any movement of material must observe rigorous radiation protection and security measures.
Security concerns may be as challenging as technical ones. John Bolton, who served as US national security adviser in the previous administration, has pointed to the early 2000s removal of Libya’s small nuclear materials as a precedent, but he stressed that Iran’s program is far more advanced and that Libya’s handover occurred in a relatively permissive environment. Removing hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium during or after conflict would be a larger, riskier operation and could take much longer.
Bolton and others also emphasize the strategic imperative of preventing highly enriched uranium from falling into the hands of terrorists or other states of concern. Some US commentators argue that only removing the current Iranian regime or otherwise ensuring long-term nonproliferation guarantees would eliminate the risk of future weaponization, a view Tehran and many international actors reject.
Any transfer, dilution or disposal of Iran’s enriched uranium would likely require firm international arrangements, transparent IAEA verification, and secure transport and storage plans. Until those technical, political and security issues are resolved, the exact fate of the stockpile will remain uncertain.
Edited by Shamil Shams