China’s National People’s Congress approved the Law Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress last week by an overwhelming margin: 2,756 votes in favor, three abstentions and three against. About 442 delegates from ethnic minority groups—roughly 14% of the legislature—took part in the vote.
The 65-article statute, which takes effect on July 1, is presented by Beijing as a tool to strengthen national unity and eliminate disparities among ethnic groups. China recognizes 56 official ethnic groups. The Han majority makes up roughly 92% of the country’s 1.4 billion people. Other recognized groups include the Mongols (about 6.3 million), the Hui (11.4 million), Tibetans (7.1 million) and Uyghurs (11.7 million); some small communities, such as a tiny Jewish population, are not officially recognized.
Article 1 frames the law’s aim as forging a ‘strong sense of the community of the Chinese people’ and promoting the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.’ Rather than listing new criminal penalties, the law points to existing criminal statutes: Article 62 says that when organizing, planning or carrying out violent terrorist activities, ethnic division activities or religious extremist activities constitutes a crime, offenders will be held criminally responsible in accordance with the law.
Critics argue the law’s language and broad definitions give authorities wider latitude to label calls for cultural autonomy as ‘separatism’ and to expand repression of minorities. Observers warn that vague references to ‘ethnic division’ and ‘extremism,’ combined with criminal law cross-references, could be used to criminalize cultural, linguistic or religious practices.
Turgunjan Alawdun, president of the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, said the new law, together with the 2016 anti-terrorism law that justified mass internment, will deepen repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, especially around language, culture and religion. The World Uyghur Congress represents exiled Uyghurs; its president uses the term ‘East Turkestan,’ associated with Uyghur separatists.
Rights groups and analysts point to the recent history in Xinjiang, where authorities detained large numbers of Uyghurs in so-called ‘vocational education and training centers’ framed as de-radicalization programs. Human rights organizations and researchers describe these policies as forced assimilation and Sinicization, causing significant cultural and personal harm. Jack Burnham of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said the law effectively provides legal cover for intensified measures that have included limits on prayer, demolition of historic mosques, and incentives for large-scale Han resettlement. Uyghurs now make up about 45% of Xinjiang’s population.
A prominent change in the statute is the elevation of Mandarin as the basic medium of education and public life. The law requires schools and educational institutions to use the nation’s common language and script as the basic teaching medium and calls for promoting preschool Mandarin so that students finishing compulsory education acquire a basic understanding of the common language and script. Ideologically, it directs the state to lead each ethnic group to ‘carry forward an ethnic spirit with patriotism at its core’ and to foster identification with the motherland, the Chinese people, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
Observers say these provisions effectively prioritize Han-majority norms and bind ethnic groups more closely to the Han-dominated majority and the Communist Party. Critics contend the law pressures minorities into ‘mixed communities’ with substantial Han populations and places Mandarin above regional languages that many communities regard as central to their identity. Similar policies have sparked unrest before: in 2020, large protests erupted in Inner Mongolia after authorities moved to replace Mongolian-language textbooks in primary and middle schools.
Because of its broad scope and linkage to criminal statutes, the law has stoked fears that ordinary cultural, linguistic and religious practices could be recast as criminal ‘ethnic division’ or ‘extremism,’ particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang where identity suppression has already escalated.
This article was originally published in German.