A debate in the European Parliament this week made one thing clear: when it comes to Iran, Europe is struggling to turn concern into influence.
Members of Parliament argued over how the EU should respond to the US‑Israeli strikes against Iran, exposing sharp divisions across the bloc and within the EU’s institutions. Strasbourg revealed a Europe deeply affected by the crisis but far less able to shape it than it would like.
“The EU has absolutely no meaningful role at the moment. Full stop,” said Julien Barnes‑Dacey, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “The Europeans are irrelevant.”
Once a broker
The EU once saw itself as a key diplomatic actor on Iran. From 2006 the EU High Representative coordinated talks between Washington and Tehran that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designed to limit Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. After the deal was signed, the EU remained its main coordinator and defender.
Now a bystander
Much has changed. US President Donald Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA dealt a major blow to the diplomatic framework Europe had invested in. But Barnes‑Dacey argues Europe’s loss of relevance cannot be blamed on Trump alone: for years the bloc has deprioritised the Middle East, and both Washington and Tehran increasingly stopped viewing Europeans as central mediators.
“Neither the US nor the Iranians look to Europe to be a serious and credible diplomatic mediator,” he told DW. Analyst Maneli Mirkhan, born in Tehran and based in Paris, agrees Europe has lost ground but adds that Europe was too naïve for too long. While focusing on diplomacy and sanctions, she says, the bloc failed to stop Iran from advancing military, nuclear and technological capabilities.
The familiar problem: Europe is divided
Both experts point to a familiar obstacle: internal division. EU foreign policy still depends heavily on consensus among member states, hard to achieve in a fast‑moving security crisis.
Spain has taken the toughest line, condemning the strikes as violations of international law. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz initially appeared to endorse the US‑Israeli aim of regime change before rowing back. Germany, France and the UK now urge more caution, pairing calls for restraint with criticism of Iran.
Brussels, too, has sent mixed messages: EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has pushed de‑escalation, while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has spoken of a “credible transition” and “renewed hope” for Iranians.
The bigger picture
Barnes‑Dacey says disunity is compounded by strategic weakness. Europe has focused its geopolitical energy on Ukraine and has been reluctant to confront Washington on Iran for fear of undermining cooperation on trade and the broader transatlantic relationship. “The Europeans remain strategically focused on protecting the transatlantic relationship above all else because they want to ensure the Americans stay aligned with them,” he said.
That trade‑off is paradoxical. On Ukraine the EU has been indispensable, coordinating sanctions, aid and military support; on Iran it looks peripheral. Barnes‑Dacey attributes this to geography and priorities: Ukraine is treated as an existential security issue in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood, while the Middle East has slipped down the list despite obvious spillover risks. It also reflects a harder truth: Europe still struggles to use its economic weight strategically.
Sidelined, but impacted
Being sidelined does not mean being untouched. Mirkhan warned that Europe could pay a high price if Iran is left badly weakened but politically intact. A prolonged conflict could push up energy costs, destabilise the region and create new migration pressures on Europe. “If we don’t manage to create conditions for a relatively stable transition, then the risks are very, very high for Europeans,” she said.
A role to play
Here the analysts diverge. Barnes‑Dacey is sceptical Europe can recover meaningful influence without a major shift in political will. Mirkhan is more optimistic: although Europe is no longer central to the military phase, it could play an important role if the regime falls—supporting opposition figures, facilitating dialogue, and helping shape a democratic transition. Europe should move “from declarative and symbolic actions to more of a driving force,” she argues.
For Barnes‑Dacey, the verdict is stark. If this were a test of whether the EU is a meaningful geopolitical actor, “Europe has failed.” The Iran crisis exposes the gap between Europe’s geopolitical ambitions and its ability to act on them. On Ukraine the EU has shown it can matter when it speaks with one voice. On Iran, it has yet to prove it can be more than a bystander.