Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, relations with neighboring Pakistan have been punctuated by chronic tension and periodic flare-ups. Those tensions spiked again this week as both sides exchanged strikes in what officials called the most serious escalation since the Taliban once held large parts of southern Afghanistan in the 1990s.
The last major outbreak occurred in October 2025, when about 70 people were killed on both sides. That confrontation produced several rounds of talks and a brief ceasefire brokered by Qatar and Turkey, but no durable settlement followed. On Friday Pakistan’s defense minister described the situation as an “open war” between Islamabad’s forces and the Afghan Taliban.
Islamabad accuses the Kabul government of sheltering and supporting militant groups, chiefly Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS‑K). Earlier this month ISIS‑K claimed a suicide attack on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad that killed at least 31 people; Pakistani officials say the bomber had traveled to Afghanistan beforehand. Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador and international affairs expert, has pointed to rising cross-border attacks and UN Security Council monitoring reports showing an uptick in militant activity originating from Afghan territory, making 2025 particularly deadly for Pakistan.
The most recent round of fighting began when Pakistan conducted airstrikes inside Afghanistan, targeting sites it said were militant hideouts in border provinces such as Nangarhar, Paktika and Khost. A few days later a Taliban government spokesperson announced “large-scale offensive operations” against Pakistani military bases along the Durand Line and claimed that 19 Pakistani army posts had been destroyed.
Pakistan then launched broader strikes early Friday on what it described as Taliban military targets in multiple Afghan cities. Pakistani officials reported strikes in Kabul, Paktia and Kandahar, saying they killed more than 130 Taliban fighters and destroyed headquarters, ammunition depots, tanks and artillery. Afghanistan’s Taliban-run Defense Ministry countered with its own casualty figures, saying 55 Pakistani soldiers had been killed and several taken captive. Those tallies and damage assessments could not be independently verified. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid also accused Pakistan of flying reconnaissance aircraft over Afghan airspace.
Analysts say the drivers of this violence are complex. Some point to internal dynamics within the Taliban: while senior leaders may recognize the political sensitivity of the TTP issue, many mid- and lower-level fighters sympathize with jihadist causes and may be reluctant to act against allied militants. Using force against the TTP risks fracturing Taliban ranks and could push some Pakistani militants toward ISIS‑K, analysts warn.
From an Afghan viewpoint, many see Pakistan as the provocateur. Kabul-based security analyst Tameem Bahiss says Afghans who hoped for a fragile return to stability interpret Pakistani strikes as attempts to portray Afghanistan as a militant haven and to pull the country back into conflict. That perception can be politically useful to the Taliban, allowing it to rally domestic support and claim victimhood.
In Pakistan, officials and security experts increasingly describe cross-border strikes as routine pressure intended to signal to Afghan publics that the Taliban are harboring terrorists. Islamabad-based analyst Qamar Cheema summarized this approach by saying that strikes “have become the new normal,” part of a strategy that Islamabad sees as exhausting diplomatic options and increasing the costs for the Taliban. Maleeha Lodhi adds that Pakistan has combined military action with economic and diplomatic measures—border closures, trade suspensions—to try to change Taliban behavior.
The Taliban government, for its part, insists it prefers negotiation. At a recent press briefing, Mujahid reiterated Kabul’s stated emphasis on a peaceful solution and said the Taliban still seeks dialogue to resolve the dispute.
These exchanges mark a dangerous escalation with wider regional implications. Mutual accusations, unverified casualty claims and active strikes across a porous border raise the risk of prolonged confrontation. Whether tit‑for‑tat airstrikes become an enduring “new normal” will depend on several factors: whether credible diplomatic channels can be reestablished between Islamabad and Kabul; whether outside mediators can broker a lasting arrangement; and whether the Taliban can rein in militant groups operating from Afghan territory without provoking internal splits that drive fighters toward more extreme networks. Until those conditions change, the cycle of violence and retaliation looks likely to persist.