Iran’s ties to Africa are centuries old, modernized under the last shah and maintained after the 1979 revolution. Tehran pursues strategic, economic, military, religious and academic links across the continent while trying to circumvent international sanctions. Iranian exports to Africa jumped dramatically in 2025—rising about 85% from 2024—and the country hosts many African students, forges technology and cultural partnerships, and contributes in health and humanitarian sectors.
The US-Israel war with Iran is hitting Africa at a fragile economic moment. Disruptions to global trade have forced some ships to bypass the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, lengthening voyages, raising shipping costs and lifting consumer prices. In Nigeria, gas prices reportedly rose around 11% in one week. Analysts also warn of knock-on effects for African migrant workers in the Gulf—more than 400,000 Kenyans alone are employed there—whose incomes and remittances could be affected.
Iran’s footprint in Africa remains smaller than that of some Western powers, but it is active: Tehran maintains diplomatic missions in 22 African countries and regularly convenes Iran-Africa forums. With Western influence waning in parts of the Sahel—especially following France’s reduced role—Iran has moved to deepen ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). High-level visits include Burkina Faso’s defense minister meeting Iran’s leadership in Tehran and Niger’s prime minister traveling to Iran in early 2024.
Energy and mineral resources draw attention. Niger produces a notable share of global uranium, and reports have alleged that Tehran sought to buy substantial Nigerien uranium soon after Niger’s 2023 coup. A 2024 Africa Defense Forum article claimed Iranian approaches to purchase 300 tons of uranium, a move some fear could help Iran bypass sanctions and advance nuclear ambitions. Journalists and analysts in the Sahel, however, say no confirmed large-scale uranium transfers to Iran have occurred. Tehran insists its nuclear activities are civilian.
Military and technological cooperation is growing in other areas. Niger and other Sahelian governments have acquired Iranian drones amid rising insecurity and a regional appetite for surveillance and strike capabilities. While many African buyers source drones from Turkey, Iran’s drone manufacturing is increasingly sought by states confronting terrorism. Observers also note that the ongoing war could temporarily slow some Iran–Africa cooperation as Tehran redirects political, military and diplomatic resources to the Middle East.
Religious and cultural influence is another vector. Iran leverages institutions, scholarships and local Shiite networks to project soft power. Significant Shiite communities exist in parts of West Africa—Guinea, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria—and in some East African countries. The regional Sunni–Shiite rivalry, often framed as competition with Saudi Arabia, plays out through cultural outreach. Some African clerics with ties to Tehran have publicly condemned attacks on Iranian leaders and voiced solidarity with the Iranian state, reflecting a range of local responses.
Overall, analysts say the longer-term consequences for Africa are uncertain. The war’s immediate economic shocks—higher transport costs, rising fuel prices and risks to migrant labor incomes—are clear. But whether Iran’s expanding diplomatic, military and cultural ties will reshape regional alignments, resource politics or security dynamics across the continent will depend on how the conflict evolves, how African governments balance external partnerships, and whether alleged deals such as uranium transfers materialize.
Edited by: Keith Walker