A remark meant as a joke has inflamed public opinion in Iceland. In January, Billy Long, President Donald Trump’s nominee for ambassador to Iceland, told US lawmakers that Iceland should become the 52nd US state and that he would be its governor. The comment prompted immediate backlash: the Icelandic foreign ministry asked the US embassy for clarification, social media filled with criticism, and thousands of Icelanders in a country of about 400,000 signed a petition demanding a different nominee. Long later said the remark was not serious and apologized for any offence.
That episode sits atop broader tensions between the Trump administration and NATO partners over Arctic policy, including the row around Greenland. Icelanders fear their island could be treated as a pawn in great-power rivalry. Iceland’s location—closer to Greenland than much of continental Europe—sharpens anxieties about security and sovereignty.
Against this backdrop, Reykjavik is seriously considering European Union membership. The current centre-left government, which favors EU ties, had planned a referendum on accession for 2027 but is reportedly weighing moving the vote forward to August. Polls show notable support for joining: roughly 45% in favour and 35% opposed in recent surveys. An early-last-year RUV poll found that about three-quarters of respondents viewed the United States as a threat.
Iceland is already closely tied to Europe through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA). It enjoys single-market access and participates in Schengen, but it remains outside the EU. The biggest barrier to full membership has long been the EU’s common fisheries policy. Fishing is Iceland’s most important economic sector; accession would require allowing EU fleets access to Icelandic waters and following EU quota rules, stoking fears of lost control over stocks and potential overfishing.
On defence, Iceland is a founding NATO member but has no standing army and has relied on US security guarantees for decades. That dependence is under new scrutiny amid recent disputes. Economic strains have added to the unease: the Trump administration applied 15% tariffs on certain Icelandic products, a significant hit for a country that relies heavily on fish exports. The United States remains Iceland’s second-most important trading partner after the EU, so these measures have pushed interest in closer European ties despite concerns in the fishing sector.
This is not Iceland’s first flirtation with the EU. After the 2008 financial collapse—when the country’s three largest banks failed, unemployment rose to about 10%, the krona plunged, and Iceland accepted an IMF loan of more than $2 billion—Reykjavik applied for EU membership seeking stability. Formal negotiations began but were frozen by a eurosceptic centre-right government in 2013, and the application was withdrawn in 2015 as the economy recovered.
Brussels appears open. EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, after meeting Iceland’s foreign minister, called Iceland a “trusted partner and a close friend of the EU” and said they agreed to stay in close contact amid a shifting geopolitical landscape. Because Iceland already participates in EEA and EFTA frameworks, the EU views accession as a relatively straightforward negotiating process. Observers note that Iceland’s joining would also carry a geopolitical signal to Washington amid strained transatlantic relations.
The debate in Iceland balances security, economic self-interest, and sovereignty—above all control of fishing resources—while reacting to changing global power dynamics. Whether Reykjavik will set an earlier referendum date and move toward accession remains an open question.
This article was originally written in German.