As the US-Israeli war with Iran expands, secondary instability across the Middle East is rising. Countries in the region are seeing growing violence at home as community loyalties and political systems are tested.

“The Middle East is burning,” Mohamed Chtatou, a professor at Mohammed V University in Rabat, wrote in an op-ed. He described not a single blaze but “a constellation of simultaneous blazes that respond to, feed off, and spread with their own logic.” Several fellows at the European Council on Foreign Relations warned similarly that “the Middle East and beyond is embroiled in new violent upheaval and wider escalation could lie just around the corner.”

Iraq’s balancing act

After Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, days of protests erupted outside the US embassy in Baghdad. The demonstrations turned violent, with observers saying many participants were sent or encouraged to attend by Iraqi paramilitaries aligned with Iran. Those paramilitaries have also attacked US bases and airports in Iraq, including in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.

Tensions in Iraqi Kurdistan rose after US media reported possible US support for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to start an insurgency inside Iran. Iranian Kurdish parties have offices in Iraqi Kurdistan — which Iran has bombed — though those parties denied fighters were crossing into Iran. ACLED warned that strikes in Kurdish-majority western provinces, including attacks on border guards and internal security positions, “suggest that peripheral destabilization may be underway” and warned of the risk of prolonged domestic instability with wider regional implications.

Kurdish leaders are in a difficult position. They have stressed Iraqi Kurdistan would not be part of the conflict, but reports of an Iranian Kurdish insurgency add strain to already tense relations between Erbil and Baghdad over oil revenues and Kurdish rights. Iraq’s federal government includes many Shiite politicians sympathetic to Iran; if Kurdish officials or their forces are seen as supporting an insurgency in Iran, the consequences could be severe.

Threats in Bahrain

In Bahrain, protests against the US-Israeli war on Iran turned violent and authorities have arrested people for posting anti-war messages and “expressing sympathy” with Iran. Bahrain is a Sunni-ruled monarchy with a Shiite-majority or near-majority population and has long repressed dissent. The country saw major pro-democracy protests in 2011 that were crushed with the assistance of a Saudi-led security force. Unverified reports this week suggested those forces might have been redeployed to help control fresh protests.

Lebanon: Communal tensions

The conflict has heightened the standoff between Lebanon’s government and Hezbollah, the powerful Shiite militant and political organization aligned with Iran. As part of a 2025 ceasefire deal, Israel and the US demanded Hezbollah disarm; the Lebanese government also wants disarmament to avoid further Israeli retaliatory strikes, but the national army lacks the capacity to force disarmament, producing a looming standoff.

After Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel, provoking a major Israeli response, Lebanon’s government outlawed any military and security activities by the group on March 2. That move brings a potential showdown between Hezbollah and the Lebanese army closer. Societal tensions are rising too: many Lebanese, including Shiites who once supported Hezbollah, are now opposed to the group. L’Orient Today reported interviews with Shiite families sheltering in Beirut after Israeli evacuation orders for much of southern Lebanon, noting that popular anger at Hezbollah has grown. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced, and Human Rights Watch has warned about forced displacement. A proposed two-year delay to Lebanon’s elections, originally scheduled for May, has also been discussed because of the conflict.

More to come?

Analysts note the emotional and religious significance of Khamenei’s death. Mohammed Albasha, founder of the Basha Report risk-analysis consultancy, said Khamenei held a spiritual role for some Shiite groups comparable to the pope for many Catholics, making loyalty not only political but religious. Because of differences in how groups view his authority, the strongest reactions are likely from those that accept this religious leadership. Albasha suggested Hezbollah and some Iraqi militias might push Lebanon and Iraq toward deeper confrontation, whereas in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, Shiite groups are less likely to directly challenge governments, though small-scale disruptions by fringe elements cannot be ruled out.

Not all pro-Iran groups across the region — including the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, and some Syrian groups — ascribe the same religious status to Khamenei, which could shape varying responses. The war’s expansion threatens to produce more secondary conflicts and prolonged instability across the Middle East. Edited by Maren Sass

As the US-Israeli conflict with Iran widens, retaliatory Iranian strikes across the region are fuelling a second wave of instability. Governments and communities across the Middle East are confronting rising violence at home as loyalties and political systems are strained.

“The Middle East is burning,” wrote Mohamed Chtatou of Mohammed V University in Rabat in a recent op-ed, describing not a single conflagration but “a constellation of simultaneous blazes that respond to, feed off, and spread with their own logic.” Several fellows at the European Council on Foreign Relations likewise warned this week that the region is immersed in new violent upheaval and that broader escalation could be near.

Iraq’s balancing act

After Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, days of protests erupted in Baghdad outside the US embassy. Demonstrations turned violent; observers say many participants were mobilized or encouraged by Iran-aligned Iraqi paramilitary factions. Those militias have also struck US bases and airports in Iraq, including in the semiautonomous Kurdistan region.

Tensions in Iraqi Kurdistan rose further amid reports the United States was planning support for Iranian Kurdish groups that might open an insurgency inside Iran. Iranian Kurdish opposition parties maintain offices in Iraqi Kurdistan and have been hit by Iranian strikes; those parties deny fighters are crossing the border. ACLED’s Middle East research manager, Muaz al-Abdullah, warned that strikes in Kurdish-majority western provinces and attacks on border and internal security positions suggest peripheral destabilization that could prolong domestic instability and affect regional security dynamics.

Kurdish authorities insist Iraqi Kurdistan will not be drawn into the conflict, but the rumors compound existing friction between Erbil and Baghdad over oil revenues, autonomy and rights. Iraq’s federal government includes many Shiite politicians sympathetic to Iran; if Kurdish officials or their forces were perceived as aiding an insurgency against Iran, that could dangerously inflame relations with Baghdad and Tehran.

Threats in Bahrain

In Bahrain, anti-war protests against the US-Israeli campaign on Iran turned violent and authorities arrested people for posting anti-war content and for “expressing sympathy” with Iran. Bahrain is a monarchy that restricts political dissent; the ruling family is Sunni while a slight Shiite majority lives in the country. Bahrain’s 2011 pro-democracy uprising was crushed with help from the Saudi-led Peninsula Shield forces—now called the Unified Military Command—and unverified reports circulated this week that similar security assistance may have been deployed again.

Lebanon: communal tensions

The conflict has deepened a confrontation between Lebanon’s government and Hezbollah, the powerful Shiite militant and political movement aligned with Iran. The United States and Israel have demanded Hezbollah disarm; Beirut’s government has signaled the same preference to avoid more Israeli strikes and incursions. But Lebanon’s army lacks the capacity to disarm Hezbollah, leaving a standoff that risked breaking into open confrontation.

After Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel and a large Israeli response followed, Lebanon banned any military and security activities by the group on March 2. That moves the country closer to a showdown between Hezbollah and the state security forces. Public opinion appears to be shifting: observers report growing opposition to Hezbollah, even within parts of the Shiite community that once backed it. L’Orient Today described a turn from near-unanimous solidarity with the “resistance” to anger at an escalation seen by some as “pointless” and self-destructive.

Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced by fighting and evacuation orders, with limited safe options. Human Rights Watch has warned against forced displacement, and many of those uprooted are now facing popular anger directed at Hezbollah. The war has also likely pushed Lebanon’s national elections, scheduled for May, back by about two years.

More to come?

Analysts warn the political fallout of Khamenei’s death carries deep emotional and religious weight. Mohammed Albasha, founder of the Basha Report risk-analysis consultancy, said Khamenei holds a spiritual role for some Shiite groups comparable to the pope for Catholics; loyalty to him, Albasha argued, is both political and religious.

Not all Shiite actors accept that religious authority. Albasha suggested the strongest reactions are likeliest from groups that do. Hezbollah and some Iraqi militias could press Lebanon and Iraq toward wider confrontation, he said. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, he added, Shiite communities are less likely to directly challenge their governments, though small-scale disruptions by fringe elements cannot be ruled out.

The broader picture is one of multiple fault lines being tested simultaneously: state-versus-nonstate armed actors, sectarian divides, intra-state political tensions, and the potential for cross-border spillovers. As regional and international players respond, the risk of wider, protracted instability remains significant. Edited by: Maren Sass