US President Donald Trump said it would be “wonderful” if Iranian Kurdish forces based in Iraq launched attacks against Tehran, telling Reuters he would be “all for it.” Unconfirmed reports say Trump has spoken with several Kurdish leaders and that the CIA may have supplied weapons to Kurdish groups; the White House denies these reports.
The Kurds are one of the largest stateless peoples, roughly 30 million strong across Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, speaking several dialects and mostly following Sunni Islam. About 9 million live in Iran, mainly along the western border with Iraq and Turkey, with a long history of grievances and uprisings against both the Islamic Republic and the pre-revolution monarchy. Many Iranian Kurds have fled to Iraq; Iraqi Kurds now govern a semiautonomous region, and some Iranian Kurds see an opportunity to press for greater autonomy at home.
Bringing Kurdish forces into a conflict with Iran raises the classic “boots on the ground” question. Middle East expert Hanna Voß says the limits of airpower have made ground forces relevant again, and US officials have repeatedly stated they do not want to deploy troops to Iran. In that context, Kurdish groups could become de facto ground forces. Thousands of Kurdish fighters are already stationed along the roughly 1,500-kilometer Iran–Iraq border, and observers say they might advance into Iran with US and Israeli air support. The Washington Post reported Trump promised Kurdish leaders “extensive air cover.” Israel’s air force has already struck military, border and police posts in western Iran.
There are doubts about Kurdish military capabilities. A US government source told Axios that Kurdish fighters could, in the worst case, “become cannon fodder.” Conflict researcher Hessam Habibi Doroh notes Kurdish groups are the strongest politically and militarily among Iran’s border-region actors due to long experience in conflict, but they are not uniform—organized differently but linked by strong networks.
Many Kurdish politicians insist they are not seeking secession. Hassan Sharafi of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan told DW Persian that Iranian Kurds see themselves as part of Iran and that calls for democracy and equal rights are often labelled separatist. Doroh says some Kurdish groups had already signalled willingness to fight the Islamic Republic before the current hostilities, viewing the moment as a historic opportunity, but most remain cautious, aware the regime would ruthlessly suppress dissent.
Some Kurdish groups are preparing the local population for potential escalation. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) urged residents in western Iran to build neighborhood and village structures in case the region descends into prolonged conflict. Voß warns Kurdish military capacity is limited: even with external arms, small units would face Iran’s deeply entrenched and organized security apparatus, shaped by decades of counterrevolutionary preparedness.
A Kurdish advance risks igniting new internal tensions in Iran’s multiethnic society. Voß warns that external military support for particular ethnic groups could stoke internal conflicts and alienate many Iranians outside Kurdish regions. Iranian media increasingly portray Kurdish groups as existential threats to the state—an exaggeration, Habibi contends—but Tehran could exploit such narratives to mobilize other ethnic or religious groups against the Kurds.
There are also regional implications. A strengthened Kurdish presence could affect Turkey, which is engaged in its own conflict with Kurdish groups; President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would oppose Kurdish empowerment in the region. Kurds remember being abandoned by international partners in the past, fostering skepticism about foreign commitments.
For many observers, the focus is less on whether Kurds will rise than on the consequences for regional stability. A Kurdish military push might yield short-term tactical gains but risks long-term instability; strategically it offers limited depth. Most regional actors have little interest in a completely chaotic Iran, and a broader breakdown could have unpredictable, damaging effects.
This article was originally written in German.
