Eighteen days after US and Israeli strikes on Iran killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening hours of the war and removed other senior figures, Tehran’s power core has not collapsed. Analysts say the initial shock was absorbed and Iran’s armed apparatus remains able to operate.
Middle East analyst Habib Hosseini‑Fard told DW Iran’s power structure “has overcome the initial shock.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), despite losses, continues strikes against the US, Israel and neighboring states, relying on a decentralized, well‑connected command network.
Israel announced this week it had killed Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and said the Basij militia head Gholamreza Soleimani was also struck. Iran confirmed Larijani’s death and army chief Amir Hatami warned of a “decisive and regrettable” response.
US Central Command reported Iran launched more than 300 attacks over two weeks on targets in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain. Saudi Arabia said it intercepted over 60 drones in one night. The UAE reported one death and one injury from falling debris after projectiles hit Abu Dhabi. The scale of the confrontation is unprecedented in the region.
Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has ruled out negotiations and refused a cease‑fire while US and Israeli strikes continue. The IRGC — founded after the 1979 revolution to safeguard the regime and its ideology — remains central to Iran’s response. Alongside the regular army, the IRGC answers to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and is estimated to have up to 200,000 personnel.
Experts note the IRGC has shifted over the past two decades from a rigid hierarchy into a networked structure. Provincial commands have greater autonomy and can act independently, making the force harder to incapacitate quickly. Strategic depth, underground missile silos, and dispersed infrastructure also complicate efforts to destroy Iran’s military capabilities in a short timeframe, analysts say.
Even after claims by the US and Israel of striking some 15,000 targets, Iran has continued rocket and drone attacks, including strikes on Israeli cities and an assault on the US embassy in Baghdad. Attacks have also affected Gulf shipping and bases across the region.
Political analyst Reza Talebi cautions against assuming that state weakness or a “failed state” scenario would automatically produce military collapse. Ideologically committed elements within Iran’s security apparatus remain closely tied to the regime. The Revolutionary Guards are not solely a military actor: they control foreign operations through the Quds Force, maintain alliances with militant groups across the Middle East, and exert economic influence via entities like Khatam‑al‑Anbia, a construction conglomerate involved in strategic projects and major investments.
Those institutional interconnections make a rapid relinquishing of power unlikely. If the outer layers of the system are weakened, the result could be intensified internal conflict rather than orderly change. A breakdown, if it occurs, could resemble the fragmentation seen in Syria or Afghanistan, not a smooth transition.
From Israel’s perspective, a weakened but functioning security structure in Tehran may be preferable to a total power vacuum. Analysts say US and Israeli aims now appear to focus on degrading Iran’s military capacities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and applying pressure to facilitate internal protest — rather than forcing an immediate, complete collapse of the regime.
Given Iran’s institutional resilience and the IRGC’s decentralized operations, both a quick cease‑fire and the abrupt fall of the Revolutionary Guards seem unlikely. The most probable outcome, analysts conclude, is a continuation of hostilities — at current intensity or possibly expanded — prolonging regional instability.
This article was originally published in German.