A few days ago a large convoy of trucks carrying Iraqis was filmed crossing the southern border into Iran. The convoy was described as a “humanitarian mission,” but observers suspected it included members of an Iraqi paramilitary group allied with Tehran and might be heading to assist Iranian security forces.
Could those Iraqis be dragging their country into the Iran war? Experts say that is unlikely to be decisive for the conflict itself. Even if fighters are present, the war is being shaped primarily by airstrikes, missiles and broader regional calculations, Hayder al-Shakeri of Chatham House noted. Omar al-Nidawi of Enabling Peace in Iraq (EPIC) added that Iran does not need foot soldiers from Iraq; the convoy may be aimed at perception and deterrence, signaling Iran’s ability to mobilize allied militias across borders and suggesting the threat of wider escalation against US allies.
The greater danger, analysts say, lies inside Iraq. The convoy reportedly involved elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella of militias formed in 2014 to fight Islamic State. Roughly 238,000 personnel are counted under the PMF structure; the group has since been formally integrated into Iraq’s security apparatus, with pay and political representation. But the PMF is internally diverse. Some factions are closely aligned with Iran and are part of the so-called “axis of resistance” alongside Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. Other factions are more Iraqi-nationalist or pragmatic.
Since attacks on Iran by the US and Israel in late February, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq have launched strikes they say target American or Israeli interests. These have included attacks on diplomatic and military facilities, civilian infrastructure such as oil fields and hotels, and cross-border rocket fire. Even relatively small PMF factions can have an outsized effect if they launch attacks from Iraqi territory or provoke retaliation; that exposure can drag the whole country into broader conflict even though most Iraqis do not want such escalation.
The US has responded to some of these attacks by striking PMF strongholds—something it had previously tried to avoid—raising the risks of escalation on Iraqi soil. Baghdad convened an emergency parliamentary session, ordering the arrest of anyone attacking Iraqi security institutions, civilian sites or diplomatic missions. Yet in the same session it empowered all military units, including the PMF, to respond in self-defense to attacks on them. That ambiguous posture was criticized as effectively making Iraq a belligerent in the regional war by granting broad self-defense claims to militia elements, potentially rendering the state accountable for their actions.
The country’s security dilemma was underscored this week by the kidnapping of American journalist Shelley Kittleson in central Baghdad. Reports suggest the abductors were members of Kataib Hezbollah, a PMF faction; anonymous sources said the group had Kittleson’s name on a list of targets and later offered to negotiate for her release. If a PMF faction is responsible, it illustrates a troubling reality: both the forces pursuing the journalist and those who may have taken her are formally part of Iraq’s official security apparatus.
Tensions between state security institutions and Iran-aligned militias have risen during the current conflict. Some militias have attacked Iraqi state bodies—including the National Intelligence Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service—accusing them of ties to the US. The counter-terrorism units’ well-known training with American forces has been seized on by militias as evidence of collaboration. Sercan Caliskan of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies described this as a long-standing covert rivalry now reaching a dangerous threshold, with different elements of Iraq’s security architecture effectively pitted against one another.
This fragmentation is a structural problem. The PMF’s ambiguous status—simultaneously an official security actor and a collection of armed groups with independent agendas—creates space for kidnappings, coercion and attacks that intimidate institutions and undermine state authority. As pressure on these groups increases, their behavior may become more brazen and frequent, worsening instability and threatening civilians.
There are no easy solutions. Al-Nidawi likened the “hijacking” of the Iraqi state by armed groups to a decades-long train wreck whose debris is now scattering. Reducing Iran’s ability to exert influence in Iraq would help, but that seems unlikely in the near term. Another hope is that more pragmatic and politically entrenched PMF factions—those that prefer stability and benefit from Iraq’s political economy—could pressure the more militant elements to stand down. That dynamic is possible but limited.
A key obstacle to any coherent response is Iraq’s political paralysis: the country has not yet formed a new government since last November’s elections. Al-Shakeri argued that Baghdad’s immediate priority must be damage control—containing escalation and pushing for government formation. Only once a government is in place could there be meaningful openings for reform to clarify the PMF’s role, strengthen accountability, and restore state authority—though progress would still depend on internal actors committed to a stronger central state and on regional dynamics.
For now, the most urgent tasks for Iraqi leaders are to prevent further attacks from Iraqi territory that could invite external retaliation, to rebuild the capacity and cohesion of official security institutions, and to pursue political arrangements that reduce militia autonomy. If those steps fail, Iraq risks deeper destabilization even if it does not become a formal battleground in the Iran war. Edited by: Andreas Illmer