A few days ago a long convoy of trucks carrying people across Iraq’s southern border into Iran was filmed and described by some as a “humanitarian mission.” Observers, however, warned that the convoy likely included members of an Iraqi paramilitary group aligned with Tehran and could be headed to support Iranian security forces. That prospect has rekindled fears that actions by militias in Iraq might draw the country deeper into the broader conflict around Iran.
Analysts say such movements are unlikely to change the course of the war itself. The fighting has been driven mainly by airstrikes, missile exchanges and regional strategic calculations, not by the incremental deployment of ground fighters, a Chatham House expert noted. Another analyst argued that Iran does not strictly need infantry from Iraq; the convoy may be part of a messaging campaign, demonstrating Iran’s ability to mobilize allied militias across borders and to signal a wider deterrent threat toward US partners.
The more immediate danger, experts say, is internal. The convoy is reported to have involved elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a coalition of militias set up in 2014 to fight Islamic State. Some 238,000 personnel are counted under the PMF umbrella, and the organization has been formally folded into Iraq’s security framework, receiving state pay and political seats. Yet the PMF is not monolithic: it includes Iran-aligned factions that form part of a broader “axis of resistance” alongside groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, as well as factions that are more Iraqi-nationalist or pragmatic.
Since strikes on Iran by the US and Israel in late February, Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have launched attacks they say target American or Israeli interests. These actions have ranged from strikes on diplomatic and military facilities to attacks on civilian infrastructure like oil installations and hotels, and cross-border rocket fire. Even small PMF factions can have outsized effects: an attack launched from Iraqi soil, or an incident that invites retaliation, can entangle the entire country in conflict despite the fact most Iraqis do not want escalation.
The US has responded to some of these attacks by striking PMF positions on Iraqi soil—an approach Washington had tried to avoid previously—raising the prospect of further escalation inside Iraq. Baghdad convened an emergency parliamentary session that both ordered the arrest of anyone attacking Iraqi security institutions, civilian sites or diplomatic missions, and simultaneously authorized all military units, including the PMF, to act in self-defense. Critics say that mixed posture effectively grants militia elements broad self-defense claims and risks making the state appear a belligerent in the regional confrontation.
This tension was highlighted by the recent kidnapping of American journalist Shelley Kittleson in central Baghdad. Reporting linked the abduction to Kataib Hezbollah, a PMF faction, and suggested the group had previously listed her as a target and later engaged in negotiations over her release. If confirmed, the case underscores a worrying reality: both the forces pursuing the journalist and those allegedly responsible for her abduction are formally part of Iraq’s official security architecture.
Relations between state security institutions and Iran-aligned militias have deteriorated during the current crisis. Some militias have attacked Iraqi state bodies, including the National Intelligence Service and the Counter-Terrorism Service, accusing them of ties to the US. The well-known training connections between counter-terrorism units and American forces have been seized on by militias as proof of collaboration. Observers describe a long-running, largely covert rivalry between different elements of Iraq’s security architecture that has now reached a volatile new stage.
That fragmentation is a structural problem. The PMF’s dual identity—as an official component of the security forces and as a constellation of armed groups with independent agendas—creates space for kidnappings, coercion and attacks that undermine institutions and intimidate the public. As pressure builds on these groups, their actions may become more frequent and brazen, worsening instability and endangering civilians.
There are no easy fixes. One analyst compared the effective “hijacking” of parts of the Iraqi state by armed groups to a decades-long train wreck whose debris is now spreading. Shrinking Iran’s influence in Iraq would reduce the problem but seems unlikely in the short term. A more realistic hope is that pragmatic, politically embedded PMF factions—those that benefit from Iraq’s political order and prefer stability—could exert pressure on more militant elements to stand down. That dynamic is possible but limited.
A major obstacle to coherent policy is Iraq’s political paralysis: the country has not yet formed a new government since last November’s elections. Damage control, experts say, must be the immediate priority—containing escalation while pushing for a functioning government. Only a new administration would have the political leverage to propose meaningful reforms: to clarify the PMF’s role, strengthen accountability, and rebuild state authority. Progress would still depend on domestic actors willing to assert central control and on the region’s shifting balance of influence.
In the near term, Iraqi leaders need to focus on preventing attacks from Iraqi territory that could invite external retaliation, rebuilding the capacity and cohesion of official security forces, and negotiating political arrangements that reduce militia autonomy. If those measures fail, Iraq risks deeper destabilization even if it does not become an official battlefield in the Iran conflict.
Edited by: Andreas Illmer