For 75 years the United States has held wartime operational control (OPCON) over South Korean forces, a structure rooted in the 1950–53 Korean War and subsequent armistice. Under this arrangement Seoul commands its forces only in peacetime; in a major conflict Washington would assume operational leadership of combined forces.
A transfer of OPCON had been planned for 2015 but was postponed amid concerns that Seoul needed to meet certain conditions to face the growing threat from North Korea. The question of handing full wartime command to South Korea resurfaced during a recent visit by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
Washington’s current administration supports the transfer, urging allies to shoulder more of their own defense, while South Korean President Lee Jae‑myung aims to complete the handover before his term ends in 2030. For many in South Korea, wartime OPCON is a matter of national sovereignty and prestige, and progressive administrations have long pushed for it as a symbol of normalization.
But analysts warn the transfer may be premature. Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In‑bum and others caution that focusing on a calendar date risks neglecting whether the South Korean military is truly prepared. Critics argue North Korea could interpret the handover as a weakening of deterrence if South Korea lacks necessary capabilities.
US and South Korean military leaders have reported “meaningful progress” after recent talks, and Washington’s political leadership has expressed support, with Hegseth calling Seoul’s position “great.” Still, key benchmarks remain: South Korea’s ability to lead combined US–ROK forces, to respond effectively to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, and to maintain regional stability.
Observers point to specific capability gaps. Professor Mason Richey notes South Korea needs stronger command-and-control systems and improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to lead combined operations tactically and operationally. Beyond systems, Seoul’s military lacks recent experience exercising operational independence; Korean forces have not led such combined wartime operations since the Korean War.
Despite these concerns, Lee’s government appears determined to meet its timeline. The president frames OPCON transfer as a way to reduce the US defense burden in the Indo‑Pacific and to secure more sovereignty over South Korea’s armed forces—an insurance policy against unpredictable US policy. Given Washington’s backing, Seoul’s parliamentary majority and public support, the transfer before 2030 remains a realistic political goal, even as debates continue about whether the military conditions for a safe and effective handover are in place.
Edited by: Darko Janjevic
