Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and contributing writer at The Atlantic, told Terry Gross on Fresh Air that the United States is already well into a dictatorship or very close to one under Donald Trump. Kagan, author of Rebellion: Donald Trump And The Antiliberal Tradition In America, traced the direction of current policy and personnel moves—domestic and foreign—and argued they fit textbook patterns of authoritarian consolidation.
Kagan’s central claim is that Trump’s first year of a second term (2025) saw rapid dismantling and co‑optation of core institutions: the federal bureaucracy was hollowed out, and the Justice Department, FBI, and CIA were repurposed as instruments of presidential power. In his view, ICE has been transformed into a “brute squad” used to intimidate and control populations rather than primarily enforce immigration law. Those acts, Kagan says, are characteristic of dictatorships.
Election control is a crucial element of this consolidation. Trump continues to insist the 2020 election was stolen and has publicly advocated federalizing elections in at least 15 states and placing Republican officials in charge of oversight. Kagan calls this a blatant declaration of one‑party dictatorship—illegal under the Constitution, which assigns election regulation to the states—but symptomatic of a shift from legality to raw power politics. He warns that seizing ballots (as the FBI did in Fulton County, Georgia) and creating national voter files are being framed to justify federal intervention in state elections and to delegitimize results unfavorable to Trump.
Kagan sees motive in Trump’s insistence that the 2020 result was stolen: setting a pretext for future intervention. If Trump believes a Democratic takeover of one or both houses of Congress will lead to his impeachment and loss of power, he will use the federal instruments he controls to block that outcome. Possible tactics include seizing ballots in Democratic districts, invoking national emergency powers or the Insurrection Act, and using intimidation and deportation to suppress turnout among nonwhite and immigrant voters. Kagan calls the use of ICE operations, such as those in Minneapolis, not primarily immigration policy but a test run for political disruption aimed at scaring away voters and producing the kind of unrest that could justify military or federal takeover.
On the judiciary, Kagan is pessimistic about a reliable check. While lower federal courts might rule against overreach, he fears the Supreme Court—given its recent record—could defer to executive claims of national security or otherwise fail to block authoritarian measures. Historical precedent like Korematsu shows courts often retreat when national security is invoked. Kagan also doubts that enough Republicans in Congress will oppose Trump; he says four Senate senators could matter but sees little optimism they will act.
Kagan situates Trumpism within a longer American antiliberal tradition: a strain of white Christian nationalism and ethnoreligious definitions of America that have opposed the universalist principles of the Declaration of Independence since the founding. That strain, he argues, never truly disappeared after Reconstruction and Jim Crow, and it now dominates the Republican Party. Trump’s rhetoric and policy reflect and weaponize that identity politics, combining personal megalomania—narcissism, disregard for constitutional limits, and a hunger for power—with a political project rooted in white Christian supremacy. Kagan stresses this is a homegrown phenomenon; comparing it to foreign dictatorships risks treating it as something that could not happen in America.
Internationally, Kagan argues Trump has effectively undermined the post‑World War II American order without formally withdrawing from institutions like NATO. His attacks on allies, tariff wars, threats to territories such as Greenland, and public questioning of Article 5 commitments have eroded allied trust. Europeans, Kagan says, increasingly view the United States as an adversary or a predatory power, complicating collective security in the face of Russia and China. The consequence could be a return to a multipolar world—multiple great powers pursuing spheres of influence—which historically has been far more prone to war and instability. Alliances and the network of partners that once amplified U.S. power are fraying, leaving Washington weaker even if it remains materially strong.
Kagan also critiques Trump’s mixed signals: although he publicly claims to want to withdraw from global entanglements and focus on the Western Hemisphere, his administration actively meddles in European politics, supports far‑right parties, wages tariff wars, and pursues regime change in places like Venezuela and Iran. For Kagan, Trump seeks both to control America’s domestic political order and to project personal dominance abroad—“world emperor” fantasies—making his foreign policy neither restrained nor coherent, but dangerous.
What can stop this? Kagan calls for broad civic and elite resistance. He criticizes institutions that have accommodated or done business with Trump—corporate leaders, law firms, university presidents—and urges courage and collective action. He highlights the bravery of protesters in places like Minneapolis but warns popular protests alone are insufficient. He suggests Americans must abandon the comforting normalcy bias and act decisively to preserve democratic institutions.
Kagan is skeptical about an easy restoration to the pre‑Trump status quo if authoritarian changes consolidate. Rebuilding the federal bureaucracy and “power ministries” after they have been repurposed would be costly and fraught. Even if Democrats later win, purging or reversing the personnel and structural shifts Trump has enacted could leave an American polity that looks and functions differently. He cautions that democratic progress is not inevitable—the mid‑20th‑century arc toward liberalism was driven not just by ideas but by events like the Great Depression and World War II—and reversals are possible and already under way.
He closes with an urgent warning: the combination of institutional capture, electoral manipulation, racialized politics, and international isolationism threatens to end American pluralism and democratic rule. Kagan frames the current moment as a “five‑alarm fire” that requires immediate, broad‑based resistance from citizens, elites, and institutions if the United States is to avoid the consolidation of dictatorship.