What kind of political system is America becoming? Some scholars warn the United States shows signs of a model they call “competitive authoritarianism.” The phrase describes systems that keep democratic institutions and hold elections, but where the ruling party routinely bends rules and uses state power to skew the playing field in its favor.
The term was coined in 2002 by Harvard’s Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way to describe countries like Serbia, Kenya and Peru. They meant to capture regimes that compete in elections yet steadily weaken checks and balances, independent institutions and opposition capacity. Levitsky says the concept was never meant to be aimed at the U.S., but in recent years people have begun applying it to American politics.
What does competitive authoritarianism look like in practice? Levitsky and others point to tactics such as turning state institutions into tools against opponents, using litigation or prosecutorial power selectively, attacking critical media and undermining academic freedom. He has cited actions like pardons for those involved in the January 6 attack on the Capitol as an example of deploying the state to shield allies who engaged in illegal behavior.
Observers compare these maneuvers to playbooks used by leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: elected leaders who preserve the trappings of democracy while weakening the institutions that make democracy meaningful.
The origin of the phrase is a bit accidental. Levitsky and Way originally used a different label — “contested autocracy” — but a colleague’s slip of memory turned it into “competitive authoritarianism,” and the name stuck.
Since the term gained traction, searches and mentions have spiked in the media and public conversation. Supporters of the label argue it helps explain why democratic forms remain while democratic substance erodes. Critics caution that the United States still retains many core freedoms: robust press outlets, outspoken commentators, street protests and active civil society. They note examples such as late-night hosts continuing to criticize political leaders and large nationwide demonstrations that signal continued space for dissent.
Importantly, competitive authoritarianism is not permanent rule. Leaders who pursue this strategy can be voted out or undone by economic problems, corruption scandals and unified opposition. Orbán, often held up as a model of competitive authoritarian governance, ultimately faced a strong electoral backlash when economic and corruption issues mounted.
The debate over whether the U.S. fits this category is fundamentally about a spectrum rather than a binary label. Some scholars and journalists see worrying patterns that resemble competitive authoritarian tactics; others see resilient democratic institutions that, so far, continue to function. The phrase has proven useful as an analytic tool because it highlights the ways elected leaders can hollow out democratic norms without immediately abolishing elections and formal liberties.
Whether one accepts the label or not, the discussion raises clear questions: are state institutions being neutral arbiters or partisan instruments? Are legal and administrative tools used fairly, or weaponized? And ultimately, how much erosion of norms and institutions should we tolerate before we conclude a democracy has been seriously compromised? Those are the questions animating the growing conversation about competitive authoritarianism in the United States.