As tensions between the United States and Iran raise the risk of a broader regional conflict, Lebanon stands in a precarious and uncertain position. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has repeatedly insisted that Lebanon will not take sides in foreign disputes and has urged Hezbollah to avoid dragging the country into “another adventure.”
Hezbollah’s deputy leader Naim Qassem warned that any US strike on Iran would be treated as an attack on Hezbollah. In a statement updated on February 26, 2026, the group said an attack on Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, would be a “red line,” according to AFP. Israel, Washington’s closest regional ally, has warned Beirut it would respond forcefully and target civilian infrastructure if Hezbollah became involved in a US–Iran war, a warning confirmed by two Lebanese officials this week.
Analysts say Tehran would likely expect Hezbollah to exert pressure on Israel in any confrontation, but Hezbollah faces growing domestic constraints. Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow for Middle East security at RUSI, notes the group must balance Tehran’s expectations with Lebanon’s internal politics. President Michel Aoun’s efforts to fold Hezbollah into state structures and the movement’s political stake in Lebanon raise the political and material costs of engaging in a major, open-ended war.
Hezbollah’s recent performance and fractures
Hezbollah’s armed wing—designated a terrorist organization by the United States, Germany and others—launched attacks on Israel in support of Hamas the day after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 assault. A ceasefire in November 2024 brought an end to 11 months of low-level clashes and two months of full-scale fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. During that period Israel reportedly killed large parts of Hezbollah’s leadership, struck the group’s infrastructure and arms, and hit wide swaths of southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut. About 4,000 people were killed and the World Bank put reconstruction costs at roughly $11 billion.
The ceasefire called for disarmament, but Hezbollah has relinquished arms only south of the Litani River and refuses full demobilization, saying it still needs to defend Lebanon against Israeli strikes and the continued Israeli presence at certain points along the border. Israel has said it will continue to target Hezbollah as long as it views the group as a threat. Hezbollah remains a core member of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance,” alongside Hamas, the Houthis and various Iraqi militias, and it continues to view the United States and Israel as adversaries.
Salam has said the state will press ahead with efforts to disarm Hezbollah beyond Phase 1 territory (the strip between the border and the Litani) and described disarmament as an “irreversible sovereign choice.” He added that moving into Phase 2, north of the Litani, depends on several factors, including the outcome of an international conference in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces planned for March 5, 2026, in Paris.
Observers warn that delaying disarmament risks making the task harder as Hezbollah rebuilds. The Institute for the Study of War has cautioned that postponement could allow the group to reconstitute forces. Still, analysts such as Mohanad Hage Ali of the Carnegie Middle East Center argue Hezbollah remains weaker and more fragmented than before the fighting, a condition that complicates unified decision-making.
Inside Hezbollah, the military wing resists disarmament while the political wing—well represented in parliament and responsible for hospitals and social services—is more open to compromise. Hage Ali stresses that the political dimension, tied deeply to Lebanon’s Shiite community, carries substantial influence, meaning any disarmament push must navigate delicate domestic politics.
What Hezbollah might do
Most analysts expect Hezbollah’s response to any US–Iran escalation to be limited and symbolic rather than a full-scale campaign. Ozcelik suggests the group could carry out calibrated strikes against Israeli targets to signal solidarity with Tehran while trying to avoid provoking devastating Israeli retaliation. She and others warn, however, that a change in the conflict’s dynamics, or direct Israeli action against Hezbollah, could force a more forceful response.
Public fear and fatigue in Lebanon
Lebanon’s population, already battered by an economic collapse that began in 2019, chronic political paralysis, the 2020 Beirut port explosion, and the 2023–24 fighting with Israel, shows little optimism. Many see reconstruction and international aid as contingent on Hezbollah’s disarmament, making outside assistance appear uncertain.
Voices around the country reflect anxiety and resignation. Nadim El Riz, 35, a videographer near Saida, said he feels hopeless and expects a large, deadly regional war between Iran and its proxies and the US and Israel. Raymond Khoury, 38, a fitness trainer in Beirut, said he fears Lebanon could be dragged into conflict because of Hezbollah’s ties to Iran. Fatima Naim, 27 and living in Beirut, said she copes by not thinking about possible escalation and by focusing on day-to-day life to avoid constant fear.
Lebanon now sits between competing pressures: external expectations from Iran and Israel, domestic politics that complicate military decisions, and a weary population that has already paid a heavy price. How those forces interact will shape whether the country is drawn into a wider war or manages to steer clear.
Edited by: Jess Smee
This article was updated on February 26, 2026 to reflect Hezbollah’s latest statement regarding an attack on Iran’s supreme leader.