Myanmar’s new parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing president on April 3, formalizing the junta chief’s hold on power under a veneer of civilian rule. The 69-year-old general won 429 of 584 votes in a legislature dominated by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and a bloc of lawmakers appointed by the armed forces. The parliamentary vote was the culmination of a tightly managed transition designed to keep the military at the centre of power.
Min Aung Hlaing led the military coup of February 2021 that overthrew Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) government and plunged Myanmar into a civil war. After decades of direct or indirect army rule, the NLD had won decisive victories in 2015 and 2020. The generals alleged fraud despite international observers finding no evidence of serious irregularities and staged the coup.
Five years on, Myanmar remains mired in civil war. The military holds main cities and key state institutions but controls less than half the country’s territory; large parts of the borderlands and countryside are contested or held by resistance forces. A UN report this February said around 6,800 civilians have been killed and 3.6 million displaced by the conflict since 2021, though other groups put the death toll higher.
The recent elections that paved the way for Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency were unlikely to end the bloodshed. The junta organised polls in three phases between December and January, but voting took place in only 265 of 330 townships because of fighting. The United Nations, Western governments and rights groups said the contest was neither free nor fair: anti-junta parties were effectively shut out, criticism of the vote was criminalised, and former civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi — now 80 — is serving a 27-year sentence on charges including corruption. The USDP won about 81% of the elected seats available. Under the constitution, a full quarter of assembly seats remain reserved for the military.
Min Aung Hlaing has created new mechanisms to ensure military authority remains central even under a nominally civilian government. Most notable is a five-member Union Consultative Council — a super-body above the executive, legislature and judiciary — which analysts say consolidates power for the junta rather than marking a return to civilian rule. Observers describe the transition as an attempt to formalise the coup’s outcome and treat it as a fait accompli, not a step toward democratization.
The economy has been ravaged by war, sanctions, capital flight and chronic electricity shortages. New pressures from higher oil prices and supply disruptions tied to wider regional tensions are worsening the situation. Myanmar depends heavily on refined fuel imports from Singapore and Malaysia, so rising shipping costs and oil prices feed into transport costs, inflation and daily hardship in cities already coping with blackouts. The junta has introduced fuel rationing for private vehicles. Analysts warn the energy shock complicates any attempt by the new government to stabilise a flailing economy while fighting continues across much of the country.
Battlefield trends offer little hope of a quick resolution. After suffering setbacks in 2023 and 2024, the military adapted by expanding conscription, increasing drone use and relying more on air power. In December the military made limited gains in some areas, but no single force dominates the front lines nationwide. Airstrikes have intensified and continue to cause heavy civilian casualties, particularly in Sagaing, Rakhine and other conflict-hit regions.
Before assuming the presidency, Min Aung Hlaing stepped down as military chief after 15 years. He was replaced by a close ally, General Ye Win Oo, a former spymaster who led the operation that arrested Suu Kyi in 2021. Analysts and defectors say Ye Win Oo’s rise rests on personal loyalty and patronage, signalling continuity rather than moderation at the top. Resistance forces remain resilient and announced a new umbrella body shortly before the presidential vote. Observers warn the “Spring Revolution” and the civil war are likely to continue and may even intensify, with humanitarian conditions and repression expected to worsen.
There is still internal jockeying among military figures, civilian proxies and business interests adapting to the new setup. Khin Yi, USDP chairman and former police chief, was elected speaker of the lower house in March; his early moves may indicate whether parliament will do more than rubber-stamp decisions. Some analysts expect modest political and economic reforms aimed at stimulating growth and re-attracting investors, but not genuine democratization.
Internationally, Min Aung Hlaing remains under scrutiny. The International Criminal Court prosecutor sought an arrest warrant for him in 2024 over alleged persecution of the Rohingya. China has already congratulated the new administration, and some neighbours may find it easier to engage with a nominally civilian government than an overt junta. But diplomatic optics do not alter the balance of power inside Myanmar. Observers say the fact that the military commander simply removed his uniform to become president shows the military’s internal accountability is not functioning and that the new government is likely to become an even more personal dictatorship.
The international community faces a dilemma: whether to engage pragmatically with a new, superficially civilian government to address humanitarian needs and regional stability, or to refuse legitimacy and maintain pressure for accountability and a return to democratic rule. Many activists and rights groups urge caution, warning against conferring legitimacy on a regime that emerged from a coup and continues to prosecute and attack civilians.
Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru