Pakistan has stepped up diplomatic outreach to position itself as a potential mediator in the US-Iran war, leveraging ties with both Tehran and Washington and engaging regional actors to lay groundwork for talks.
Islamabad held high-level meetings with Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to prepare for possible negotiations between the US and Iran. After those talks, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said Pakistan would be “honored to host and facilitate meaningful talks between the two sides in the coming days,” adding that both Iran and the US had expressed confidence in Pakistan to help facilitate discussions. He did not provide further details.
It remains unclear whether any talks would be direct or indirect. Washington and Tehran have issued conflicting statements about negotiations, and both countries have stopped short of confirming formal talks. Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, dismissed plans for talks in Pakistan as a “cover” for an invasion on the same day roughly 2,500 US Marines arrived in the Middle East; Qalibaf warned those forces could be “set on fire.”
Iran earlier rejected a 15-point US peace plan that had been conveyed through Pakistani mediators, calling it “excessive, unreasonable and unrealistic.” That plan asked Iran to end nuclear enrichment, dismantle nuclear sites and allow passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Foreign Ministry also refuted US President Donald Trump’s claims that talks were underway, with spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei saying at a press conference, “We haven’t had any direct negotiations yet.” Trump, meanwhile, has signaled that negotiations may be progressing but also posted threats on Truth Social that he would “obliterate” Iranian energy infrastructure if Iran did not make a deal and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
Why Pakistan is pushing to mediate
Analysts say Pakistan’s push reflects both strategic calculation and urgent self-interest. Raza Rumi, a US-based Pakistani analyst, told DW that the US-Iran conflict directly threatens Pakistan’s economic stability because of its dependence on Gulf energy supplies and remittances. Mediation, he said, allows Pakistan to project itself as a stabilizing actor while insulating against spillover from a widening regional war.
Pakistan must navigate complex pressures. It has a formal mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia and decades-long cooperation with Riyadh, yet shares a roughly 900-kilometer (559-mile) border and deep cultural ties with Iran. During Trump’s second term, US-Pakistani relations warmed; Trump met Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir twice and has publicly praised the general.
Fatemeh Aman, an Iran-Pakistan expert formerly at the Middle East Institute and the Atlantic Council, said Pakistan is among the few states able to communicate with both Washington and Tehran without being dismissed. She added that Pakistan’s motivation is to manage a conflict that could quickly have domestic consequences.
Security and economic stakes
Pakistan already faces security challenges at home: an ongoing conflict with the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan and militant separatist threats in Balochistan, which borders Iran. Aman warned that instability in Iran would have direct implications for Pakistan, from Balochistan’s security to energy access and domestic stability.
Analyst Rumi said a failed negotiating process or a protracted war would expose Pakistan to immediate economic and security shocks. Disruptions to energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz would worsen inflation and fiscal stress. There would also be heightened risks along the western border, including refugee inflows and increased militant activity. Trade routes could become unreliable, and the broader operating environment in the region would deteriorate.
Balancing Gulf ties and Iranian border realities
If Gulf states enter the conflict, Pakistan’s balancing act would become more fraught. Rumi said Pakistan would face pressure to at least offer symbolic support if Saudi Arabia became directly involved, but he argued direct military involvement would be destabilizing and unwise. Aman noted Pakistan cannot simply treat Iran as an enemy even if Riyadh asks for help; overt alignment with Saudi military action could trigger border tensions, proxy responses, economic pressure and increased sectarian strain.
Aman assessed that a direct Iranian attack on Pakistani interests is unlikely, but if Pakistan were perceived as backing military action against Iran, risks would rise. Iran would probably exert pressure indirectly through border tensions or proxies rather than conventional confrontation.
Sectarian risks and domestic fallout
Pakistan’s history of sectarian violence raises additional concerns. Iran is the world’s largest Shia-majority country, and Pakistan’s Shia community—estimated at 15–20% of a roughly 250 million population—maintains strong cultural and emotional ties to Iran. The killing of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war sparked protests in Pakistan’s northern Gilgit-Baltistan region; authorities deployed the army and imposed a three-day curfew after at least 23 people were killed. Much of the mobilization reportedly came from Pakistan’s Shia community.
Rumi warned that a Saudi-Iran conflict could deepen domestic fault lines not through immediate unrest alone but through gradual polarization fueled by transnational narratives and militant actors. He said the state’s management of messaging, law enforcement and political signaling would be crucial to containing violence.
Aman emphasized that the current crisis extends beyond sectarianism: Pakistan faces a combination of security, economic and regional pressures. The principal risk is an external conflict aggravating multiple internal vulnerabilities at once.
Conclusion
Pakistan is pursuing a delicate diplomatic course: offering to convene talks in hopes of preventing a regional conflagration that would threaten its own economic and security interests, while seeking to maintain relationships with rival powers. Whether Islamabad’s mediation can produce tangible negotiations or merely exposes it to deeper pressures will depend on developments in Washington and Tehran and on whether regional actors escalate the conflict further.
Edited by: Wesley Rahn