A small black plaque at No. 99 Andrássy Avenue in Budapest marks a grim moment from November 1956, when Soviet forces crushed Hungary’s uprising. Some Soviet soldiers who refused to take part in the repression were executed on the grounds of the Soviet Embassy—the site now occupied by the Russian Embassy. Moscow, viewing itself as the Soviet Union’s successor, has never apologized for 1956 and some Kremlin figures still dismiss the revolt as a “fascist uprising.”
Nearly seven decades later, that same embassy is alleged to be doubling as a Kremlin-run command post in Hungary’s current election battle. Investigative reporters and leaks from parliamentary discussions claim the Kremlin, working with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, his government and the ruling Fidesz party, has helped coordinate smear campaigns against opposition candidate Péter Magyar.
The April 12 parliamentary vote has been cast by many as a choice between east and west: deeper alignment with the European Union or a tilt toward Russia. Szabolcs Panyi, an investigative journalist with Vsquare, reported—citing European intelligence sources—that a three-person team of so-called “political technologists” traveled to Hungary to assist Orbán. In Russian usage, that term often refers to the strategists credited with securing Vladimir Putin’s electoral victories.
Panyi said sources told him the operatives, reportedly overseen by Sergey Kiriyenko, a deputy head of the presidential administration, were preparing a social-media offensive aimed at Magyar and his Tisza Party. The campaign allegedly included coordinated troll armies, manipulation of algorithms and fear-based messaging to shore up an otherwise weak pro-government social-media presence.
Hungary’s parliamentary National Security Committee held a confidential session where intelligence warnings about Russian political strategists were discussed, according to media reports. Government officials told MPs they could not confirm the operatives’ presence. Later reporting by the Financial Times said the Kremlin had hired the Moscow firm Agency for Social Design (ASP)—an IT and disinformation company under EU and US sanctions—to support Orbán’s campaign. The Russian embassy’s press office and Ambassador Yevgeny Stanislavov publicly attacked Magyar, accusing him of spreading falsehoods.
Magyar replied in a letter to the Russian ambassador that Hungarians are heirs to the freedom fighters of 1956 and cannot be intimidated or blackmailed; he urged Orbán to convene the National Security Council and inform voters about the alleged interference.
Orbán’s administration maintains unusually close ties with Moscow for an EU member state. The prime minister has rejected claims of Kremlin meddling. Since returning to power in 2010 Orbán and Vladimir Putin have met frequently, and Hungary remains a major purchaser of Russian energy—today importing more Russian gas than before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, despite EU and US sanctions.
In 2025 Putin praised Orbán as a leader defending national interests and suggested Europe could be renewed by politicians like him. In early March Hungary’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, flew to Moscow to meet Putin; as a gesture Putin handed over two Ukrainian prisoners of war of Hungarian descent who had appeared in Kremlin propaganda films shown by Hungarian state media. Last week Putin warned he might cut energy supplies to the EU while saying he would keep providing fuel to “reliable partners” such as Hungary and Slovakia.
Observers including Panyi interpret such remarks as implicit threats meant to bolster Orbán’s electoral standing: a signal that energy shortages and economic pain could follow if Hungarians reject a government friendly to Moscow. Critics say these pressures are part of a broader Kremlin effort to influence the outcome in Budapest.
Originally published in German.