Global shipping has been hit by a cascade of crises: attacks and blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have pushed many carriers to avoid the traditional Asia-to-Europe route through the Suez Canal. Instead, large numbers of vessels have been taking the long detour around southern Africa, adding thousands of nautical miles and two to three weeks to voyages — and bringing them close to Somalia’s coastline.
That proximity has coincided with a sharp uptick in piracy off Somalia and nearby waters. In the space of three weeks, several vessels were seized; as of May 8, 2026, the oil tankers Honour 25 and Eureka and the cargo ship Sward remained under pirate control. Analysts say organized criminal networks in Somalia are exploiting the strain on international naval patrols, which were first deployed in 2008 to suppress piracy but are now stretched thin by operations in and around the Middle East.
Security experts note that patrols conducted by the EU’s Operation Atalanta and the multinational Combined Task Force 151 still operate in the western Indian Ocean, but their remit is broad and they do not escort commercial traffic. With fewer deterrents along Somalia’s roughly 3,300-kilometer coastline, pirate groups see an opening to resume large-scale hijackings and ransom operations.
Intelligence from maritime data services points to at least two active pirate networks based largely in Puntland, in northeastern Somalia. These groups have captured traditional dhows — local, large wooden vessels — and converted them into motherships. Equipped with navigation gear, weapons and boarding equipment, the dhows let pirates operate far from shore for weeks at a time and launch attacks against commercial ships.
Observers describe these hijackings as well-funded and organized undertakings rather than opportunistic skirmishes. There are also more merchant ships in the region now, many of which are not taking the strongest precautions, increasing their vulnerability near the Somali coast.
The commercial impact could be substantial. Middle East-related disruptions have already driven up insurance premiums and fuel expenses, and pushed freight rates higher. A renewed wave of piracy would add further costs from rerouting, heightened security measures, higher speeds (which burn more fuel), and the use of private armed guards. During the height of Somali piracy in 2011, the annual economic toll was estimated at roughly $7 billion, though only a small portion of that — about $160 million — was recorded as paid ransoms; the rest reflected secondary costs to shipping and military responses.
Longer-term political and development trends are also implicated. U.S. programs that once funded coastal development and community projects in Somalia — initiatives designed to offer alternatives to piracy recruitment — have been reduced, while policy attention shifted toward counterterrorism operations. Analysts say cuts to development and intelligence support can weaken local capacity to deter or report pirate activity and reduce maritime domain awareness.
Industry guidance remains consistent: avoid entering Somali territorial waters and ports when possible, and adopt layered defenses. Measures such as deploying armed guards, physical barriers like barbed wire, improved watch routines and adherence to best management practices at sea are effective; industry analysts note there has been no successful hijacking of a vessel off Somalia when armed guards were on board.
As shipping companies weigh the costs of longer voyages against the risks of transiting contested waters, the reemergence of Somali piracy is a fresh threat to global supply chains already strained by conflict in the Middle East. Coordinated naval presence, stronger on-board security and renewed investment in coastal stability will be key to containing the new wave of attacks.