Components produced by German manufacturers have been identified in Russian drones used to attack Ukrainian cities. German media reported in January that parts, notably transistors from Bavarian semiconductor firm Infineon Technologies, were found in a Geran-5 attack drone. The findings were published on the War and Sanctions portal run by Ukraine’s military intelligence service (HUR), which maintains a detailed list of foreign components discovered in Russian military equipment.
According to the HUR database, most foreign parts in Russian systems originate from the US and China. The “Made in Germany” category lists 137 components, more than half of which were found in drones; the remainder were located in rockets, radar systems, vehicles and helicopters.
Transistors are the most frequent German items identified—around 50 components in one tally—and Infineon is the most commonly appearing manufacturer. Some 58 of the 137 German-made components cited on the list, mostly transistors, were embedded in drones. Other named German suppliers include TDK Electronics, Würth Elektronik, Bosch and Pierburg (a Rheinmetall subsidiary).
HUR provided DW with dozens of examples of Infineon transistors recovered from Geran drones, a family of UAVs derived from Iranian Shahed designs. The transistors are tiny microchips whose model and batch numbers are only visible under a microscope. HUR says each Geran drone control system, from the Geran-2 onward, typically contains eight to 12 German-made transistors. In August 2025, HUR’s deputy head Vadym Skibitskyi told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne that Russia planned to produce 40,000 Geran-2 drones a year—requiring nearly half a million transistors if those production goals were met.
HUR officials say Russia has tried to reduce dependence on Western parts, shifting some sourcing from the US toward China. Even so, Russian manufacturers appear to prefer German-quality components over perceived lower-quality Chinese alternatives. Infineon transistors, used broadly in civilian electronics, remain accessible and, according to HUR, are being obtained in quantities sufficient for military use.
These components are often readily available online. For example, Infineon transistors are offered on eBay at roughly $29.90 (€25.30) for a pack of five, and some merchants list up to 45 units. Although many vendors state they do not ship directly to Russia, Belarus or Kazakhstan, parts can still be routed through intermediary countries such as Georgia or China.
HUR suspects that Moscow largely obtains German-made transistors by ordering them from Germany through shell companies that disguise the true destination. In some cases parts are smuggled or supplied via third countries; in others, dummy businesses in Germany may purchase components from manufacturers and arrange illicit exports.
Sanctions expert Viktor Winkler told DW that shipments of military-relevant components from Germany via third countries such as Turkey, the UAE, China or Central Asian states have diminished since 2022. Instead, he said, increasingly direct channels involving criminal dummy firms in Germany appear to be used to send items to Russia. Winkler described such deliveries as legally serious but relatively isolated incidents compared with broader sanctions-evasion flows—such as luxury goods and consumer items—while acknowledging that some cases reflected long-planned business ties with Russia.
DW contacted the German firms listed by HUR; all said they do not supply Russia and comply with sanctions. Infineon said it halted deliveries to Russia in 2022 but noted it is hard to control a product’s resale over its lifetime given the company’s annual output (around 30 billion chips). Infineon said it stops supplying customers when it receives reliable indications of illicit trade and cooperates with authorities.
Rheinmetall said German customs informed it in January 2024 that civilian electrical fuel pumps produced for the automotive spare-parts market in July 2020 had ended up in Russia; Rheinmetall said those were not its deliveries and that it is unaware who exported them. The company said it is cooperating with investigators.
Würth Elektronik said it severed business ties with Russia in 2022 and subjects all deliveries to strict export controls. The company said its components are not designed or authorized for military use and that it explicitly warns customers of this. Würth also acknowledged the possibility that Russia might draw on stocks shipped before sanctions were imposed.
Bosch told DW it no longer conducts operational business with Russia and instructed global units not to do business with Russia or Belarus. Bosch said the fuel pump referenced on the HUR site in relation to the Geran-3 drone is not a Bosch product and could be a counterfeit, while a push-button switch found in a Shahed-136 drone was identified as a Bosch item that is a widely sold commodity product (for example, emergency-stop switches). Bosch acknowledged parallel imports exist, often routed through countries that have not imposed sanctions, but said it has no reliable way to gauge their scale on the Russian market.
TDK Electronics said it stopped deliveries to Russia after the war began and closed its Moscow sales office in 2023. It said it complies with EU sanctions and includes contract clauses prohibiting military use of its products but admitted that small orders via component distributors or private individuals can be difficult to trace and that civilian goods can be dismantled and repurposed for military use.
The HUR list and the manufacturers’ statements illustrate persistent challenges in preventing sanctioned components from reaching Russia: the ubiquity of certain parts in civilian markets, long and opaque supply chains, secondary markets and deliberate circumvention via shell companies or third countries. The HUR continues to document and publish examples of foreign-made parts found in Russian military hardware.
This article was originally written in Russian.
