Is Bulgaria headed toward a Viktor Orban-style rule or will entrenched corruption finally be confronted? Those questions have surfaced after Rumen Radev’s new formation, Progressive Bulgaria — an alliance of three small parties he assembled in weeks — won the parliamentary election on April 19 and looks set to hold an absolute majority.
Radev kept many policy details vague during the campaign, leaving observers uncertain about his plans and those of his partners. Looking at his biography and recent positions helps indicate possible directions.
Who is Rumen Radev?
Rumen Radev was born in Haskovo near the Turkish border in 1963. Interested in aviation from youth, he began pilot training in 1987 under the communist regime. In 1992, after democratization, he completed officer training in the United States. In 2005, a year after Bulgaria joined NATO, he became Commander of the Bulgarian Air Force.
Alleged Kremlin links
Radev first ran for president in 2016 with the support of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Reports then suggested his candidacy had been discussed in Moscow; Leonid Reshetnikov, a veteran Russian intelligence figure, later said he had discussed Radev’s bid with BSP leaders. Since those early years, media and public scrutiny have focused on possible ties between Radev and the Kremlin, an interest that intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Radev’s stance on Ukraine
During his 2021 re-election bid, Radev’s remark in a TV debate that Crimea was “currently Russian” — later clarified to “Crimea belongs to Ukraine, but is currently controlled by Russia” — attracted attention. After the 2022 invasion, Radev called for Russia to stop its military actions but increasingly criticized Ukraine and the EU. He argued that sending military support to Kyiv only prolonged the conflict, called the Ukrainian counteroffensive a mistake, and labeled politicians supplying arms to Ukraine as “warmongers.” These positions raise questions about whether Radev will sustain the pro-EU, pro-Ukraine posture of recent Bulgarian governments and whether he might obstruct common EU decisions on Ukraine as other leaders have done.
Comparisons with Orban and Russian influence
Observers caution against directly equating Radev with Hungary’s Viktor Orban or Slovakia’s Robert Fico, but they note serious vulnerabilities in Bulgaria’s information environment. Russian propaganda is widespread, complicating citizens’ access to reliable information. Sofia’s foreign ministry even coordinated with the European Commission to set up a unit to counter potential Russian meddling — an effort Radev criticized as Brussels interfering in domestic politics. Reporting has also suggested Radev’s campaign benefited from a network of former senior Bulgarian military officers with ties to Russian military intelligence, according to a European intelligence official.
Will Radev tackle corruption?
Radev publicly supported the large anti-corruption and anti-government protests of 2021, telling demonstrators, “Let’s get rid of the mafia!” Protesters targeted former prime minister Boyko Borissov and media and business figure Delyan Peevski, accusing them of corruption and judicial capture. The US and UK later sanctioned Peevski for alleged corruption; his party was ousted from the ALDE group in the European Parliament and then left the group itself.
After the 2021 protests, the pro-European, liberal, anti-corruption We Continue the Change party emerged; its leaders Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev served in an interim government appointed by Radev.
Who might Radev work with?
Mass protests recurred in December 2025 over the budget, again targeting Borissov and Peevski. We Continue the Change is now allied with Democratic Bulgaria (forming PP-DB). Radev could seek their support to secure a qualified parliamentary majority that would allow him to reshuffle the judiciary and other institutions he views as captured by Borissov’s and Peevski’s networks.
Radev has so far shown no willingness to cooperate with the nationalist, pro-Russia Revival party, which will also be represented in the new parliament. How he balances potential cooperation with pro-European anti-graft forces against pressures from pro-Russian elements and domestic political networks will shape whether his government leans toward systemic reform or toward a more Russia-sympathetic, illiberal course.
This article was originally published in German.