US President Donald Trump said there is “a very good chance we’re going to make a deal” with Iran as hopes rose for a second round of talks aimed at ending the Middle East conflict. Trump claimed Tehran had agreed to “give us back the nuclear dust,” referring to enriched uranium stockpiles Washington says could be used for weapons, and said Iran had offered not to possess nuclear arms for more than 20 years. He added that Iran was now willing to do things it had not been willing to do two months earlier and suggested any successful deal would be announced soon. He also said talks could take place at the weekend, that a two-week ceasefire might be extended (or be unnecessary if a deal is reached), and that an agreement could help lower oil prices and inflation.
Pakistani intermediaries, who have been facilitating behind-the-scenes negotiations, report progress. A Pakistani source told Reuters an imminent meeting could produce a memorandum of understanding, with a comprehensive deal to follow within about 60 days, saying “both sides are agreeing in principle” and that technical details would come later.
Inside Iran, state media present the government as unified behind parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and his negotiating team, describing the effort as a “diplomacy of enhanced strength.” Ghalibaf has emphasized cohesion with the Islamic Republic’s so-called “axis of resistance”—allied groups including Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas—portraying them as acting “as one body” in war and ceasefire.
But scepticism is growing across Iranian society. Many Iranians view the ceasefire as a chance for the US to increase military pressure, a concern reinforced by reports of additional US troop deployments. Iranian officials say they approach talks “with great caution” and stress that the military is ready to respond to threats. Deep mutual mistrust means any agreement will be difficult: besides the nuclear program, thorny issues include control and security of the Strait of Hormuz, international sanctions and Iran’s support for regional proxies.
Analysts give a mixed assessment of the talks’ prospects. Hamidreza Azizi of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) said the first Islamabad meeting appeared to have failed in concrete terms but noted signs of some progress from both American and Iranian sources. He highlighted three core problems to resolve: the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear activities and Tehran’s backing of proxies. Conrad Schetter of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies said that, overall, the parties have not moved significantly closer on their key demands, though a recent lowering of public rhetoric has created limited room for manoeuvre.
The nuclear program remains the central sticking point. The US is reportedly demanding that Iran remove enriched nuclear material from its territory. Iran has indicated it would be willing to reduce its stockpiles, but only gradually and in exchange for firm guarantees against future attacks. Analysts say a full US military campaign to force compliance seems unlikely; instead, a compromise such as a temporary arrangement or waiver lasting roughly 10 to 12 years might be politically possible.
The Strait of Hormuz represents a second major flashpoint. Iran regards influence over the strait as strategic leverage, while Western states see unfettered passage as vital for global trade. Experts warn that even isolated incidents there could spark broader confrontation. Azizi cautioned that, even if a deal is struck, the fundamental confrontation may persist in a “gray zone” of indirect clashes, proxy operations and recurring tensions.
Think-tank commentary tempers expectations for rapid, sweeping progress. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy called quick or broad advances unrealistic, and Chatham House said any ceasefire would be a necessary step back from the brink rather than a final settlement.
Domestically, analysts say talks with the US are unlikely to produce political liberalization in Iran. Schetter argued the regime has shown resilience under pressure; wartime conditions and repression have tended to strengthen its hold rather than loosen it. That reality reduces hopes for rapid improvements in civil liberties and leads many Iranians to conclude the regime is hard to dislodge and unlikely to change fundamentally in the near term.
Any breakthrough will require bridging deep strategic disagreements, credible security guarantees and painstaking technical work on nuclear materials and regional behavior. For now, participants and observers alike describe a process of cautious diplomacy: possible gains, but also enduring obstacles and the risk that confrontation will shift rather than end.
This article was originally written in German.