A joint US‑Israeli strike on Iran has triggered a wider conflict that, over two days, saw Iranian missiles strike luxury hotels, ports, neighborhoods, industrial zones, airports and oil infrastructure in neighboring Gulf states. Iran’s foreign minister told the UN Security Council Tehran would “exercise its right of self‑defense,” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it would treat US assets in the region as legitimate targets.
Iranian missiles struck the US Navy headquarters in Bahrain. Qatar said it intercepted missiles headed for Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American base in the region, and Kuwait reported strikes on Ali Al‑Salem air base, which hosts US air force personnel. Officials later reported that Iran fired large numbers of missiles at Gulf states: 137 at the UAE, 66 at Qatar and 45 at Bahrain.
Gulf leaders publicly condemned the attacks and stressed unity. Anwar Gargash, a UAE presidential foreign policy adviser and former foreign minister, warned Iran that “your war is not with your neighbors” and told local media the UAE would not simply stand by while attacked.
For years Gulf states relied on hosting US bases, buying US weapons and improving ties with Iran to deter aggression. Before the recent escalation, countries including Saudi Arabia and the UAE had warned against a US‑Israeli military campaign and refused to allow US airstrikes to be launched from their territory. Those assurances have not prevented Iranian strikes, observers say.
Analysts doubt Gulf militaries will mount large offensive interventions. Hasan Alhasan of the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes Gulf states are closer to Iran geographically and less well defended than Israel, increasing Iran’s chances of hitting targets. Still, Alhasan argues direct Gulf retaliation remains unlikely unless there are mass casualties or major infrastructure outages; responses are more likely to be limited and defensive.
Andreas Krieg of King’s College London says Gulf states could enter the war directly in narrow self‑defense terms but will mostly seek to contain spillover rather than widen the conflict. Gulf options include granting greater US access to territory or airspace, improving defensive measures, and limited retaliatory strikes. Krieg predicts immediate priorities will be bolstering air and missile defenses, protecting bases and critical infrastructure, tightening internal security, and activating continuity plans.
Diplomacy will also be central. States such as Oman and Qatar, which have kept channels open with Iran, are expected to push for an off‑ramp, using ties to Washington to seek de‑escalation. Gulf leaders are aware they bear much of the economic and security cost of prolonged retaliation—through disrupted shipping, investor uncertainty, damage to energy infrastructure, and direct strikes—and generally have a lower appetite for the risks Washington may accept.
Longer term, the crisis has eroded the security calculus that combined reliance on the US with rapprochement toward Iran. Alhasan suggests relations between Iran and its Gulf neighbors may suffer lasting damage, and Gulf governments will likely shift toward stronger deterrence. Krieg says changes will be gradual: some states may recalibrate US basing arrangements or diversify partnerships, with the overarching aim of reducing the chance that geography forces them onto the frontline of others’ conflicts.
Edited by: Ben Knight