A combined US‑Israeli strike on Iran has set off a wider confrontation, and over two days Iran launched missiles at a range of targets inside neighboring Gulf states — hitting luxury hotels, ports, residential areas, industrial zones, airports and energy infrastructure. Iran’s foreign minister told the UN Security Council Tehran would ‘exercise its right of self‑defense,’ and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned it would treat US regional assets as legitimate targets.
Missiles struck the US Navy headquarters in Bahrain. Qatar said it intercepted missiles headed for Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US base in the region, and Kuwait reported strikes on Ali Al‑Salem air base, which hosts US air force personnel. Officials later said Iran fired large numbers of missiles at Gulf countries: 137 at the UAE, 66 at Qatar and 45 at Bahrain.
Gulf leaders publicly condemned the attacks and emphasized unity. Anwar Gargash, a UAE presidential foreign policy adviser and former foreign minister, warned Tehran that ‘your war is not with your neighbors’ and told local media the UAE would not simply stand by while it was attacked.
For years Gulf states leaned on a mix of US basing and weapons purchases alongside efforts to improve ties with Tehran to deter aggression. In the run‑up to this crisis, countries including Saudi Arabia and the UAE had warned against a US‑Israeli military campaign and refused to allow such strikes to be launched from their territory. Those assurances, observers note, did not prevent Iranian strikes from reaching Gulf soil.
Analysts say large‑scale offensive intervention by Gulf militaries is unlikely. Hasan Alhasan of the International Institute for Strategic Studies points out that Gulf states are geographically closer to Iran and generally less well defended than Israel, making it easier for Iran to hit targets. He argues direct Gulf retaliation remains unlikely unless strikes produce mass casualties or devastating damage to critical infrastructure; more probable are limited, defensive responses.
Andreas Krieg of King’s College London says Gulf governments could enter the conflict directly under narrow self‑defense justifications, but their main aim will likely be to contain spillover rather than expand the war. Options for Gulf states include granting greater US access to territory or airspace, strengthening defensive systems, and carrying out restrained retaliatory strikes if necessary.
Krieg expects immediate priorities will be bolstering air and missile defenses, hardening and protecting bases and energy facilities, tightening internal security, and activating continuity plans to keep essential services running. In practice, that means accelerating deployments of interceptors, improving early‑warning systems, and preparing emergency responses for ports and oil installations.
Diplomacy will play a central role. Oman and Qatar, which have maintained communication channels with Iran, are widely expected to press for an off‑ramp and use their ties to Washington and Tehran to push de‑escalation. Gulf leaders are acutely aware that prolonged retaliation would saddle their economies and security with heavy costs — disrupted shipping, investor uncertainty, damage to energy infrastructure, and further direct strikes — and they generally have a lower appetite for the risks Washington might accept.
In the longer term, the episode has damaged the previous security calculus that rested on a combination of US presence and rapprochement with Iran. Alhasan suggests ties between Iran and its Gulf neighbors may suffer lasting harm and that governments in the region will likely seek stronger deterrence measures. Krieg expects changes will be cautious and incremental: some states may recalibrate US basing arrangements, diversify security partnerships, and invest more in air and missile defenses to reduce the chance that their geography forces them onto the frontline of others’ conflicts.
For now, Gulf governments appear set on a strategy of containment, defense and diplomacy — increasing protection for critical assets and relying on international and bilateral channels to limit escalation while avoiding large offensive commitments that would widen the war.