Just hours after Israeli and US strikes hit Tehran, Russia’s UN ambassador Vassily Nebenzia condemned the attacks as “an unprovoked act of armed aggression against a sovereign and independent UN member state.” Moscow is one of Iran’s few staunch backers, and a collapse of the Iranian regime would damage Russian geopolitical and economic interests. Yet Moscow has not moved to militarily rescue Tehran. Why?
Russia-Iran cooperation
Moscow and Tehran cooperate on projects that matter to Russia, experts say. One is the North–South transport corridor — a 7,200-kilometer multimodal route linking Russia, Iran and India (via Azerbaijan), signed in 2000 and reportedly about 75% complete. The corridor has gained importance for Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted its traditional transit routes.
Iran has also supplied Tehran with military support vital to Russia’s war effort. Since 2023, Iran provided so-called Shahed drones that reshaped aspects of the Ukraine conflict, though production has largely been indigenized in Russia with improved designs. Reports also indicate Russian intelligence sharing with Iran and transfers of missiles and ammunition.
The partnership is pragmatic rather than ideological. Russian officials may not be fond of Iran, but they view Tehran as a reliable strategic partner — both face international sanctions and have developed ways to bypass restrictions. Iran’s long experience evading sanctions has even made it a source of advice for Russia on circumvention tactics.
Why Moscow is unlikely to intervene
Despite these ties, analysts judge active Russian military intervention in the US–Israel campaign against Iran unlikely. Russia and Iran are not in a formal defensive alliance. Some observers point to an informal non-attack understanding between Russia and Israel as a factor limiting Moscow’s options.
Tehran appears to have expected more than diplomatic support from Moscow — tangible military-technical aid, deeper intelligence sharing and a clear deterrent message to its adversaries. Many experts say that expectation was a miscalculation. Russia and China have their own pressing strategic concerns and have so far provided Iran with the kind of material and political backing that stops short of direct intervention.
There is a longer history of skepticism in Tehran about relying on Moscow. Iranian figures have at times accused Russia of abandoning Iranian interests. Tehran’s leadership may have anticipated limits to Moscow’s willingness to risk escalation with the US and its allies.
Potential gains and losses for Russia
A prolonged conflict in Iran could have strategic advantages for Moscow. It would divert Western attention and resources away from Ukraine; media and political oxygen could shift toward the Middle East, reducing pressure on Kyiv. The US would find it harder to sustain high levels of diplomatic and military engagement on multiple fronts.
There are also potential economic benefits. Iran’s attacks have largely closed the Strait of Hormuz at times, disrupting around 20% of global oil and gas flows and driving up energy prices. Sustained higher oil and gas prices would favor Russia as a major exporter, easing domestic fiscal pressures tied to the Ukraine war.
But there are serious downsides. The fall of the Islamic Republic would be a significant loss of influence for Moscow. Russia positions itself as part of a grouping — including Iran, Syria and China — aimed at challenging the Western-led order. A rapid collapse of Iran’s government would shrink that coalition and weaken Russia’s role in its broader Eurasian sphere.
Future of the alliance
Analysts disagree on whether the Russia–Iran relationship can survive the current crisis. Some argue the absence of decisive Russian backing may strain ties, with Moscow and Beijing treating Iran as a bargaining chip and preferring to cultivate relations with whatever government emerges next rather than invest in a collapsing regime. China is thought to be similarly cautious, seeking concessions from any successor government to preserve some influence.
Others note that the Islamic Republic is likely to try to maintain close ties with Moscow, given Tehran’s estrangement from the West and Russia’s veto power on the UN Security Council. For now, both sides have incentives to preserve the partnership, even if its nature and depth are tested by recent events.
In sum, Moscow’s restraint reflects a calculation of risks and rewards: strategic and economic ties with Tehran are important, but they do not override concerns about escalation with the US and Israel, competing priorities such as Ukraine, and the potential long-term costs to Russian influence should Iran’s regime collapse.
