Eighteen days after US and Israeli strikes that reportedly killed Iran’s supreme leader and other senior figures at the start of the war, Tehran’s core power structures have not disintegrated. Analysts say the initial shock was absorbed and Iran’s security apparatus remains capable of mounting operations across the region.
Middle East analyst Habib Hosseini‑Fard told DW that Iran’s power structure “has overcome the initial shock.” Despite losses, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has continued to conduct strikes against the US, Israel and neighboring states, drawing on a decentralized, well‑connected command network.
Israel this week said it had killed Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and that Basij militia commander Gholamreza Soleimani had also been struck. Iran confirmed Larijani’s death, and army chief Amir Hatami warned of a “decisive and regrettable” response.
US Central Command reported that Iran launched more than 300 attacks over two weeks on targets in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain. Saudi forces said they intercepted over 60 drones in a single night. The UAE reported one death and one injury from falling debris after projectiles hit Abu Dhabi. Observers describe the scale of the confrontation as unprecedented in the region.
Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has ruled out negotiations and declined a cease‑fire while US and Israeli strikes continue. The IRGC — created after the 1979 revolution to protect the regime and its ideology — remains central to Tehran’s response. Along with the regular army, the IRGC answers to the supreme leadership and is estimated to have as many as 200,000 personnel.
Experts note the IRGC has evolved over the past two decades from a rigid top‑down hierarchy into a more networked structure. Provincial commands now have greater autonomy and can act independently, which makes the force harder to incapacitate quickly. Analysts also point to Iran’s strategic depth — including underground missile facilities and dispersed infrastructure — as factors that complicate efforts to eliminate its military capabilities in a short window.
Even after claims by US and Israeli authorities that some 15,000 targets were struck, Iran continued to launch rocket and drone attacks, including strikes on Israeli cities and an assault on the US embassy in Baghdad. Attacks have also disrupted Gulf shipping and struck bases across the region.
Political analyst Reza Talebi warns against assuming that visible state weakness or the label “failed state” would automatically produce military collapse. Ideologically committed elements within Iran’s security institutions remain closely tied to the regime. The Revolutionary Guards are not only a military force: through the Quds Force they run foreign operations, they maintain alliances with militant groups across the Middle East, and they exercise substantial economic influence via entities such as Khatam‑al‑Anbia, a construction conglomerate involved in strategic projects and major investments.
Those institutional links make a rapid transfer of power unlikely. If outer layers of the system are eroded, the more probable outcome is intensified internal conflict rather than orderly change. A breakdown could look more like the fragmentation seen in Syria or Afghanistan than a smooth transition to a new government.
From Israel’s viewpoint, a weakened but functioning security apparatus in Tehran may be preferable to a total power vacuum. Analysts say US and Israeli objectives now appear focused on degrading Iran’s military capacity, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and applying pressure that might spur domestic protest — rather than engineering an immediate, complete collapse of the regime.
Given Iran’s institutional resilience and the IRGC’s decentralized operations, both a swift cease‑fire and the abrupt fall of the Revolutionary Guards seem unlikely in the near term. Most analysts judge the likeliest scenario to be a continuation of hostilities — either at the current intensity or possibly expanded — prolonging instability across the region.
This article was originally published in German.