When Viktor Orbán was narrowly defeated in 2002, he experienced a deep personal crisis, declaring that “the homeland cannot be in the opposition.” That conviction—that only he and Fidesz could legitimately represent the Hungarian nation—shaped his politics. The memory of 2002 drove Orbán, after winning a two-thirds majority in 2010, to build the so-called System of National Cooperation (NER): a reworked electoral framework, extensive clientelism, surveillance tools and a large propaganda apparatus designed to lock in his power. That system kept him dominant for 16 years.
So the scale of Fidesz’s defeat on April 12 was striking. Orbán, initially stunned by the results, withdrew from public view for several days. In his first extended interview since the vote, on the pro‑Fidesz YouTube channel Patriota, he spoke of “pain and emptiness” and vowed to resist “the destruction of what we have built.” He conceded one regret publicly: the Paks nuclear expansion with Russian assistance was not completed.
Hungarian society is now full of speculation. What will happen to Orbán and the system he forged? Can the longtime leader remain politically active, or is his career finished? Will he leave Hungary, as rumors say? What future awaits a party shaped around his person, the Orban family’s immense wealth, and the oligarchs and tens of thousands who benefited from his regime?
These questions dominate public discussion. Media monitor every statement by Orbán and his circle, and track the movements of oligarchs and cronies. The intensity of scrutiny reflects how many Hungarians felt held hostage by the system and how strong the desire is for accountability and change. Streets across the country erupted in celebrations after Orbán conceded.
So far, Orbán has not acknowledged responsibility for alleged abuses of power and shows no public remorse. During the campaign he said he would remain a parliamentarian but step down as Fidesz leader if defeated. After the loss, he resigned his parliamentary seat but has not formally quit party leadership, saying only that he was ready “for the community” and that he is not needed in parliament right now but in “the reorganization of the national side.” Fidesz will hold a leadership conference in June.
Fidesz faces a dilemma: the party is highly personalized around Orbán and could fragment without him; yet with him it remains tainted in the eyes of many as corrupt and authoritarian outside a small loyal base. To supporters his withdrawal from parliament looks like either shirking responsibility or an attempt to reassert control by avoiding parliamentary criticism; many believe he considers being an ordinary lawmaker beneath him.
There are also questions about moves by wealthy allies. Political scientist Dániel Róna suggested Orbán will wait and see before deciding his political and personal future. Investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi reported claims that Orbán considered seeking asylum in the United States—a scenario widely judged unlikely, since it would destroy his domestic project, devastate his party and harm his family’s position.
Orbán’s family and inner circle hold significant business interests. His father and younger brother rank among Hungary’s wealthiest, mainly in mining and construction. His eldest daughter, Ráhel, and her husband, István Tiborcz—also wealthy—moved to the US last year. Tiborcz has been the subject of multiple OLAF inquiries into alleged irregularities and conflicts over state tenders; OLAF recommended recovering EU funds, but Hungarian authorities shelved proceedings.
Signs of financial movement among cronies have fueled suspicion. Incoming prime minister Péter Magyar accused figures seen as Orbán’s allies of moving billions to foreign accounts to evade anti‑corruption probes and anticipated asset recovery; concrete public evidence has not been produced. Hungarian outlets have reported on suspicious transactions involving oligarchs such as Lőrinc Mészáros, Orbán’s childhood friend.
Reactions within the Fidesz camp mix disbelief and religious interpretation. Outgoing National Assembly speaker László Kövér called the result a “temporary victory for satanic forces,” while influencer Zsolt Jeszenszky suggested the defeat stemmed from Orbán unintentionally committing idolatry on a visit to India. Others blame opportunistic profiteers inside the system. Few loyalists openly cite corruption and abuse of power as reasons for the loss.
For now, much remains uncertain: whether Orbán will reinvent his role, retreat from politics, or attempt to reshape the movement from outside parliament; how Fidesz will reorganize without the electoral dominance it once enjoyed; and whether legal and financial scrutiny of his network will lead to asset recovery or prosecutions. Hungarians continue to watch closely, debating accountability and the future shape of their politics.
This article was translated from German.