Since seizing power from a democratically elected government in February 2021, Myanmar’s military has seen its control shrink as armed resistance groups seized large swaths of territory. The coup damaged the economy, left the regime widely isolated and prompted allegations of war crimes. Over the last 18 months, however, the military has reversed some losses, launched fresh offensives on several fronts and begun limited political maneuvers to regain legitimacy.
Aung San Suu Kyi, detained since the coup, was moved to house arrest, a step U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres described as “a meaningful step toward conditions conducive to a credible political process.” Critics say the transfer is cosmetic and meant to polish the military’s image rather than signal reform.
The regime staged elections widely dismissed as rigged; many parties, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), were banned. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party claimed victory, and coup leader Min Aung Hlaing was chosen by the new parliament as president after stepping down as commander-in-chief. Western governments largely rejected the vote as a sham, yet some countries have begun reengaging: foreign ministers from Thailand and China have paid official visits, and ASEAN faces pressure to restore Myanmar’s full membership privileges.
On the battlefield, resistance groups still control or contest much of the ground they captured after the coup, but the military has retaken important areas, including trade routes to China and Thailand that had been severed. China has exerted pressure on some larger armed groups to hand back territory, curtail fighting with the military and stop arms transfers to other groups. That diplomatic pressure has aided the junta’s stabilization efforts.
A critical dynamic has been the weakening of the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). The PDFs emerged nationwide after the coup and carried much of the fighting, often alongside older ethnic-minority armies. Field research cited by Amara Thiha of the Peace Research Institute Oslo indicates a rise in PDF defections in recent months, leaving some units too small for coordinated operations. Even previously ascendant ethnic armies such as the Arakan Army and Kachin Independence Army are reported to be under strain.
Analysts describe the resistance as in “structural decline” while the regime stabilizes, especially in the Bamar-majority central areas that are the military’s traditional heartland. Htet Shein Lynn of the Institute for Strategy and Policy‑Myanmar says the military is not decisively winning but is no longer continuously losing. Steve Ross of the Stimson Center agrees that momentum has shifted toward the military over the past year and a half, though he stops short of calling this a full victory.
The period of heaviest losses for the military came during Operation 1027 in late 2023 and early 2024, when resistance forces captured two regional command headquarters and hundreds of battalion bases. Since then, the junta has leveraged external assistance, notably from China, to blunt further losses and begin regaining ground. Analysts argue the resistance is too fragmented to deliver an outright defeat to the regime, but also unlikely to be decisively crushed in the near term.
The conflict remains intense compared with pre‑coup levels. Tens of thousands of combatants and civilians have died, and more than three million people remain displaced. While overall fighting has eased somewhat from its peak around Operation 1027, violence is still widespread and public anger over the coup means armed opposition is likely to continue.
The military faces its own vulnerabilities: internal elite tensions, governance deficits outside urban cores and an economy that has not recovered. These structural problems limit how far and how fast the junta can consolidate control. Still, through territorial gains, a contested election that provides a veneer of legitimacy, diplomatic outreach and the weakening of key resistance components, the military has moved from near survival toward a more stable, if fragile, position.
In short, the junta is not unequivocally winning a conclusive victory, but it has regained momentum and is incrementally prevailing in some areas. The conflict is likely to remain protracted: the military has greater confidence than a few years ago, but the conditions for an enduring peace or clear military triumph do not yet exist.