Reports from an unnamed European intelligence service — picked up by independent Russian outlet iStories and by major Western media — say the Kremlin has sharply increased security around President Vladimir Putin amid fears of assassination or a coup. The leaks have split analysts: some find the idea plausible given successful Ukrainian covert operations inside and beyond Russia; others suspect the disclosures are part of a campaign to unsettle the Russian leadership.
Whatever the truth of a putsch plot, most experts agree that Putin is growing more anxious about his personal safety. Economic strain, sanctions and the diversion of resources to the military, together with mounting pressure from security services on civilian technocrats, are intensifying rivalries among the elite.
A central claim in the leaked assessment singles out former defense minister Sergei Shoigu, now secretary of the security council, as a potential destabilizing figure. The report portrays Shoigu as someone who, despite losing influence since being dismissed from the defense ministry, still commands loyalty within parts of the armed forces. Roman Anin, the journalist who runs iStories, argues this reflects rising tensions within the siloviki — the security and military clans that wield much power in Russia.
Shoigu and Putin were long-time associates: Shoigu led the Ministry for Emergency Situations for more than a decade before becoming defense minister in 2012, and the two were publicly shown in informal settings together. Observers say Shoigu’s standing declined after the setbacks in the Ukraine campaign, and he was removed from the defense post in 2024. Still, analysts point out he avoided the harsher fates met by other senior officials who have fallen from favour.
Recent high-profile prosecutions underscore the purges and infighting inside the security apparatus. Former deputy defense minister Ruslan Tsalikov was arrested on charges of running a criminal organization that allegedly embezzled state funds. Other deputy ministers have faced similar outcomes: Timur Ivanov was jailed, Pavel Popov sentenced, and proceedings continue against Dmitry Bulgakov. These cases are widely read as evidence of elite circulation and a drive to punish or remove rivals.
The leaked report also warned of a possible assassination carried out from within elite circles, potentially using drones. That anxiety appears to have driven concrete security changes in Moscow: the May 9 Victory Day parade was greatly scaled back, communications and mobile networks were disrupted in parts of the capital, and electronic warfare systems that can jam drones were deployed. Kremlin security itself has been ramped up, and Putin has cut back public appearances.
Political analyst Ekaterina Schulmann has said publicly that Putin’s reduced visibility and the parade changes reflect genuine concern for his safety. Abbas Gallyamov, a former Kremlin speechwriter now abroad, notes the pattern of attempted or foiled Ukrainian attacks on senior Russian figures and says elite military-political rivalries are becoming more fractious. Still, Gallyamov and others argue that most factions are avoiding open confrontation and are adapting rather than attempting to overthrow the center.
Not all commentators accept the coup narrative. Mark Galeotti, a specialist on Russian politics, calls the flurry of reports — tied to an anonymous ‘‘European intelligence agency’’ — suspicious and possibly a psychological operation designed to sow paranoia inside the Kremlin. He doubts Shoigu today has the authority, trust or resources among leadership circles to mount a successful putsch.
Analysts emphasise structural reasons why a coordinated coup is difficult. Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser at the Central Bank of Russia, describes the elite as a series of overlapping patronage pyramids. Each patron controls access to resources and decision-making for their network; these patrons are poorly coordinated and often compete rather than cooperate. That fragmentation makes collective action against the president unlikely, she says.
But Prokopenko warns the balance could change if economic conditions worsen and the pool of resources shrinks further. War and sanctions have reduced what she calls ‘‘the cake’’ available to distribute among elites, and a heavier share of remaining resources now flows to the military sector. This heightens rivalry and could increase instability, because elites compete for Kremlin favour and a greater share of limited spoils.
In this dynamic, much of the infighting is not aimed at overthrowing the system but at securing more resources and influence inside it. Putin’s role as arbiter — granting or denying access and wealth — remains central: as long as patrons benefit more from his rule than they would without him, they lack incentive to remove him. That dependency, analysts say, simultaneously divides and stabilizes the ruling circle.
In short, the story that a coup is imminent is contested. Leaks and heightened security show real anxiety in Moscow, and tensions among military and security elites are rising. But fragmentation among patronage networks, the continuing centrality of presidential favour, and doubts about the capacity of any single actor to seize power make a successful coup uncertain. Observers caution that even if a coordinated overthrow remains unlikely, persistent economic pressure and elite competition could still make the political environment more volatile.
This account was adapted from reporting originally published in Russian.