Foreign ministers from the United States, India, Japan and Australia — the four members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad — are meeting in New Delhi for three days to discuss Indo-Pacific security, energy supplies and emerging technologies. The talks come as China continues to press its geopolitical and security claims across the region.
Beyond the formal agenda, a more existential question hangs over the gathering: how to keep the Quad politically relevant and operational as strategic competition with China intensifies and intra-member tensions rise.
The grouping has not convened leaders since the 2024 summit in Wilmington, Delaware, hosted by then-US President Joe Biden. India had been due to host the next leaders’ meeting in late 2025, but that was derailed by strains in US–India relations after the inauguration of President Donald Trump. His administration imposed tariffs and punitive duties on Indian imports, repeatedly criticized New Delhi’s defense purchases from Russia, and made public claims — seen as meddlesome by some in India — about mediating regional disputes. Those actions contributed to friction with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.
Marco Rubio, serving as US Secretary of State for the visit, is tasked with repairing those ties. Observers say his assignment is delicate: Washington’s attention is divided by crises elsewhere, and domestic political signals from the US leadership have complicated India’s calculus about the depth and reliability of the partnership.
Analysts note that the Quad was created to expand an effective trilateral security arrangement among the US, Japan and Australia by adding India as a major regional partner. Some experts argue that US missteps toward India have alienated New Delhi and undermined that purpose. Japan and Australia have pushed to keep the four-way arrangement functional, and some suggest that a US delegation led by Rubio could be less polarizing than direct engagement by President Trump.
There are real stakes. If top-level US engagement wanes — for example, if a future US president declines to attend a leaders’ summit likely planned for Australia in late 2026 — the Quad risks becoming geopolitically marginal. That would be a clear strategic win for Beijing, which has long viewed the Quad with suspicion and framed it as an attempt at containment.
A weakened or fragmented Quad, analysts warn, would reinforce perceptions of declining US commitment, allied disunity, and the limits of minilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. That uncertainty could unsettle smaller regional states that prefer a stable balance of power without being forced to choose sides.
Still, there are reasons not to assume the Quad is on the brink of collapse. The grouping is not a treaty alliance and was never designed to operate like NATO; its informal, flexible structure provides a degree of resilience. The Quad has weathered periods of inactivity before — for example, when Australia stepped back under different leadership out of concern for economic ties with China. That precedent suggests gaps in activity do not necessarily mean permanent demise.
But many experts stress the importance of mending US–India relations if the Quad is to endure. Washington tends to see India as a key partner to help balance China, expecting New Delhi to play a larger role in regional security. India, in turn, places a premium on strategic autonomy and remains cautious about arrangements that resemble formal alliances or bloc politics. Differences over Russia, trade and political expectations complicate the partnership, even as shared concerns about China and long-term regional stability continue to bind the two democracies together.
A key risk the Quad faces is strategic drift: fewer summits, reduced momentum in cooperative projects, weaker coordination on security and economic initiatives, and a slow erosion of political relevance. To counter that, discussions have circulated about widening the grouping into a “Quad-plus” format that could include partners such as South Korea, New Zealand or Vietnam to broaden cooperation and reassurance in the region.
For now, attention will focus on the tone and substance of US diplomacy in New Delhi. The crucial measure is not eliminating all disagreements but demonstrating continued political commitment, sustaining practical cooperation, and avoiding the perception that the Quad is entering strategic limbo. Its future will likely depend less on perfect unanimity and more on the members’ ability to keep cooperating despite disputes and to deliver tangible benefits that reinforce the grouping’s value to regional security.