The Strait of Hormuz’s strategic vulnerability has been clear for decades. During the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war both sides repeatedly attacked tankers in the narrow waterway, turning a critical crude artery into a battlefield. Riyadh responded by building the East–West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu; the United Arab Emirates later added the Habshan–Fujairah line to route exports to the Gulf of Oman.
Hormuz’s fragility re-emerged in late February when tensions involving Iran, the United States and Israel escalated and Tehran warned it could close the strait if attacked. The threat left hundreds of commercial vessels stranded and disrupted roughly a fifth of global energy shipments, shifting attention to ways of de-risking the chokepoint. Markets pressed other producers to raise output while governments and campaigners urged faster investment in renewable energy to reduce dependence on concentrated seaborne flows.
Gulf states are now accelerating plans to route more oil around Hormuz. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other producers are reported to be exploring new parallel pipelines and larger export terminals on alternative coasts. Atlantic Council analyst Landon Derentz urged U.S. backing for such moves, arguing that partners should “rapidly build around” the chokepoint rather than forcing ships through it. Saudi Arabia’s existing 1,200-kilometre pipeline is already carrying about 7 million barrels per day (bpd), up from 5 million before the recent crisis, and the UAE sends roughly 1.8 million bpd to Fujairah.
But the scale of the task is large. Qamar Energy CEO Robin Mills notes that roughly 15 million bpd transited Hormuz before the latest disruptions. To fully replace that seaborne flow would require roughly doubling current alternative pipeline capacity — a costly, time-consuming and politically sensitive endeavour. Many bypass proposals have existed for years but stalled over cost, distance and regional rivalries.
Some Gulf producers face hard geographic limits. Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar lack direct alternative coastlines, so nearly all their hydrocarbon exports still must pass through Hormuz unless they build long pipelines across neighbouring states. Such projects would be politically fraught and could take three to four years or longer to complete.
International organisations are also promoting broader solutions. The International Energy Agency has advocated a major pipeline from Iraq to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, a route IEA chief Fatih Birol called highly attractive for diversifying Europe’s supply options and potentially financeable. Iraq itself is moving on western export routes: the northern Kirkuk–Turkey pipeline, restarted last September, is flowing up to 250,000 bpd, and Baghdad has put the $4.6 billion, 685-kilometre Basra–Haditha southern-to-western segment out to tender. That line could later extend to Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba — or conceivably to Syria or Turkey — and might deliver up to 3 million bpd in phases. Iraq has also discussed a separate pipeline to Oman’s Duqm port.
Overland transport is also gaining traction as a resilience measure. Gulf governments plan expanded rail and road links to smooth non-crude freight flows and reduce pressure on vulnerable ports. The Gulf Cooperation Council Railway aims to build a 2,100-kilometre integrated network across the six GCC states by 2030. The UAE’s Etihad Rail increased freight services during the crisis to shift containers away from exposed terminals, and Saudi Arabia has boosted rail freight capacity and opened new inland routes to move stranded cargo. While roads and rails cannot substitute for the mass volumes carried by tankers, they provide logistical relief and insurance against future chokepoint shocks.
Large energy revenues give Gulf states the financial means to pursue pipelines, terminals and transport infrastructure. Whether they can overcome political hurdles, technical challenges and regional rivalries will determine whether this crisis marks the beginning of the end for the Strait of Hormuz’s chokehold on global energy flows. For now, a mix of faster project approvals, international financing and regional cooperation will be needed to make alternative routes a reliable reality.
Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru