For more than two decades Iran’s nuclear program has been a focal point of US‑Iran tensions. Washington accuses Tehran of seeking nuclear weapons; Iran insists its program is for peaceful energy and insists on a sovereign civilian nuclear right. The US has cited preventing an Iranian bomb as a key justification for its February 28 offensive alongside Israel. A ceasefire is now in place and talks between the parties may soon resume.
What the 2015 deal did
In July 2015 Iran and six world powers reached the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The agreement lengthened Iran’s “breakout time” — the period needed to amass enough fissile material for a weapon — from roughly two to three months to about a year. It also imposed limits on centrifuges, capped fissile material stockpiles and gave the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expanded inspection access. In return Iran received phased relief from international economic sanctions after the IAEA verified compliance.
What the JCPOA left out
The JCPOA explicitly avoided several major issues. It did not constrain Iran’s ballistic missile development or its regional policies, including support for groups such as Hezbollah and activity in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Many of its nuclear limits were time‑bound, set to expire after a decade or more, a design that assumed confidence between parties would be rebuilt over time. Critics argued the deal deferred rather than eliminated the underlying strategic contest.
The consequences of withdrawal
President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sweeping sanctions aimed at forcing Iran to accept a broader bargain. Iran initially stayed compliant, hoping other signatories would offset US pressure. As sanctions bit, Tehran began rolling back its commitments: enriching uranium to higher levels, deploying more advanced centrifuges and restricting inspector access. Over time the IAEA reported Iran’s breakout time had shortened dramatically — by 2024 to weeks or even days — although there remained no publicly available proof Tehran had decided to build a weapon.
From stalled diplomacy to open conflict
Efforts to revive or replace the deal stretched into 2025 and 2026 but collapsed after the US and Israel launched a major attack on Iran on February 28, prompting Iranian counterstrikes against Israel and US partners in the Gulf. After roughly 40 days of exchange, the US and Iran agreed a ceasefire on April 8. Negotiations are expected to resume in Islamabad, but they will take place under significantly more strained conditions than in 2015.
What negotiators are arguing about now
At the heart of current talks is time: Washington is reportedly seeking a 20‑year suspension of key nuclear activities; Iran counters that any limits should last no more than about five years. Other sticking points include the scope and independence of monitoring, the disposition of Iran’s accumulated enriched uranium, and permissible centrifuge numbers and types. These are largely the same technical and verification issues the 2015 accord addressed, but with higher stakes and less room for compromise.
Why it’s harder today
Several factors make a negotiated revival or a stronger deal more difficult than in 2015. Trust between Tehran and Washington has eroded; positions have hardened on both sides. Iran also possesses greater leverage today: despite battlefield losses it retains missile, rocket and drone capabilities, influence over regional proxy actors, and the ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. That leverage was much more limited a decade ago.
Analysts also point to differences in negotiating experience and style. Former negotiators say successful diplomacy depends as much on skilled, patient diplomacy and mutual confidence as on leverage. Observers worry that current US politics and personnel may lack the steadiness and expertise that helped produce the 2015 accord.
Is a “better” deal possible?
There are two ways to read “better.” On one hand, attacks that degraded parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could make some of Washington’s demands easier to achieve: fewer intact facilities mean fewer sites to constrain or verify. On the other hand, the strikes and ensuing conflict have hardened Iranian opinion in favour of deterrence. A growing number of Iranians now see a nuclear capability — or the ability to move quickly toward one — as a safeguard against future attacks, making durable, long‑term limits politically harder to secure in Tehran.
Bottom line
Technically, some elements of a deal that is stricter than the 2015 JCPOA might be negotiated, especially if Iran agrees to relinquish damaged or destroyed sites. Politically and strategically, however, the environment is much worse than in 2015: less trust, more leverage for Iran, and a stronger domestic appetite in Tehran for deterrence. Whether a “better” deal can be achieved therefore depends less on technical drafting than on whether both sides — and key regional and international actors — can rebuild enough confidence and stability to allow sustained, patient diplomacy.