In the run-up to Hungary’s pivotal national vote, former US president Donald Trump used Truth Social to urge Hungarians to ‘get out and vote for Viktor Orban.’ That public endorsement underscored a growing public alignment between Trump and Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, who has courted the US populist right, clashed with the EU over Ukraine policy, and promoted slogans such as ‘Make Europe great again.’
The outreach sits inside a wider strategic picture. The Trump administration’s 2025 national security strategy described much of Europe as a civilizational battleground and criticized transnational institutions and migration policies. Observers say Trump and MAGA’s embrace of Orban aims to strengthen a transnational illiberal axis; historian Timothy Snyder has described Orban as ‘central to Trumpism’ because of his symbolic role for the movement.
But endorsements do not automatically translate into votes. Polling through the year suggested Orban’s Fidesz party lagged the opposition led by Peter Magyar by double digits. Analysts including Zsuzsanna Vegh of the German Marshall Fund argue that Trump endorsements and last-minute interventions — including a prospective visit by vice-presidential figure JD Vance — mainly galvanize existing supporters instead of persuading undecided voters, who tend to prioritize local issues like the cost of living.
Vance’s trip also carried a broader signal, showing other European hard-right groups that the US MAGA ecosystem supports Orban and seeks to knit together a pan-European illiberal alliance. But electoral results across Europe offer mixed lessons. In Poland, a nationalist linked to the Law and Justice party narrowly won the presidency after meeting Trump, a result some read as evidence of growing ‘Trumpist’ influence in Central and Eastern Europe. In Romania, far-right candidate George Simion failed to gain ground despite overt alignment with Trump, suggesting domestic grievances and weak local organization often matter more than external endorsements.
There are limits and tensions. Some European far-right figures have publicly criticized specific Trump policies — for example, tariffs or the much‑mocked Greenland episode — as intrusive or counter to their national interests. When Trump once floated acquiring Greenland, leaders such as Alice Weidel, Nigel Farage, and Jordan Bardella condemned it as interference. Orban has largely avoided direct criticism, treating such disputes as ‘in-house’ American matters.
Public sentiment also complicates any straightforward transfer of influence. A January 2026 ECFR poll indicated a decline in American standing in Europe under Trump, with only 16 percent of EU citizens calling the US an ally and 20 percent describing it as an enemy or rival. That erosion of goodwill makes it harder for US-based endorsements to carry decisive weight.
Bottom line: Trump’s visible support can energize Orban’s base and signal ideological solidarity to Europe’s hard right, but experts are skeptical that it will sway large numbers of undecided voters focused on domestic issues. Hungary’s election will be the test of whether the MAGA–Orban connection converts into electoral success or instead reveals the limits of Trumpian influence in Europe.
Edited by: Carla Bleiker