At the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Donald Trump dismissed wind power, saying China sold windmills to “stupid people that buy them” and implied China did not use the technology itself. That assertion is wrong. China added record amounts of wind and solar capacity in 2025 and, by some estimates, may already have passed its peak in CO2 emissions.
China now dominates the manufacture of clean-energy equipment: it produces an estimated more than 80% of solar panels, around 60% of wind turbines and roughly 75% of electric vehicles and batteries. Those production strengths, combined with rapid domestic deployment, have left the United States behind in many clean-tech sectors.
Observers point to US policy choices under the Trump administration—pulling back from international institutions, cutting funding for multinational cooperation, and retreating from shared climate efforts—as factors that have eroded American influence and ceded ground to China. Li Shuo of the Asia Society Policy Institute notes China’s tendency to “say less and do more,” focusing on tangible delivery rather than grand pledges. David M. Hart of the Council on Foreign Relations says the US step back from established science is short-sighted and will have long-term costs.
China’s build-out is enormous and still accelerating. In one recent year it added an estimated 318 GW of solar and 120 GW of wind. Combined grid-connected wind and solar capacity reached roughly 1.8 billion kilowatts (1.8 TW), far outpacing peers such as the US and India. Li points out that in the same stretch the US installed about 20 GW of wind and solar while China installed more than 300 GW—“two completely different worlds,” he says.
That scale extends into transport and storage. In China the median new car is an electric vehicle; in the US EVs account for about 10% of new-car sales. Rapid electrification of Chinese transport supports domestic battery and motor industries; without comparable US demand, those industries face higher costs and weaker competitiveness. Trade barriers, tariffs and other restrictions have also increased costs for US clean-tech production—solar manufacturing in the US can be several times more expensive than in China.
China’s energy mix remains complex. Beijing continues to invest in coal, but its approach is shifting: coal plants are increasingly used flexibly to balance supply and demand rather than as baseload, and China is adding large-scale battery storage to smooth grid fluctuations more effectively than coal. Meanwhile, the US under Trump has promoted coal revival—issuing orders to bolster “clean coal” and moving ahead with some coal and gas projects—actions that reverse previous momentum toward decarbonization and risk slowing deployment of cheaper renewables.
Economically, the clean-tech transition has created jobs. Before recent policy rollbacks in the US, green jobs were growing faster than employment in oil, gas and coal by more than three to one. Canceling clean-energy investment risks real economic costs compared with the growth that had been projected under earlier policies.
Strategically, China is reframing climate action as an economic opportunity rather than a burden, aligning industrial policy, exports and domestic markets around renewables, storage and electric mobility. That practical, delivery-focused posture could let China assume greater informal leadership in the global energy transition even if it does not seek to be a vocal climate leader.