US President Donald Trump said it would be “wonderful” if Iranian Kurdish forces based in Iraq attacked Tehran and told Reuters he would be “all for it.” Unconfirmed reports have suggested private talks between Trump and several Kurdish leaders and even that the CIA may have supplied weapons to Kurdish groups; the White House has denied those reports.
The Kurds are one of the largest stateless peoples in the world—roughly 30 million people living across Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, speaking several dialects and predominantly following Sunni Islam. About 9 million Kurds live in Iran, mainly along the western border with Iraq and Turkey, where a long history of grievances and uprisings stretches from the pre-revolutionary monarchy through the Islamic Republic. Many Iranian Kurds have fled into Iraq; Iraqi Kurds now run a semiautonomous region, and some Iranian Kurds see current turmoil as a chance to press for greater autonomy at home.
That possibility has revived the familiar question of “boots on the ground.” Middle East expert Hanna Voß argues that limits to airpower have made ground forces relevant again. US officials have repeatedly said they do not want to deploy American troops to Iran, so Kurdish groups could become de facto ground forces if a confrontation escalates. Thousands of Kurdish fighters are already stationed along the roughly 1,500-kilometer Iran–Iraq border, and some observers say they might advance into Iranian territory with US and Israeli air support. The Washington Post reported that Trump promised Kurdish leaders “extensive air cover,” and Israel’s air force has already struck military, border and police posts in western Iran.
At the same time, there are serious doubts about Kurdish military capabilities and the risks involved. A US government source quoted by Axios warned Kurdish fighters could, in the worst case, “become cannon fodder.” Conflict researcher Hessam Habibi Doroh notes that Kurdish groups are among the strongest political and military actors along Iran’s borders because of prolonged experience in conflict, but they are not a uniform force: they are organized differently across groups even while linked by strong networks.
Many Kurdish politicians insist they do not seek secession. Hassan Sharafi of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan told DW Persian that Iranian Kurds see themselves as part of Iran and that calls for democracy and equal rights are often wrongly labelled separatist. Doroh adds that while some Kurdish groups had already signalled a willingness to fight the Islamic Republic before the latest escalation—seeing a historic opportunity—most remain cautious because the regime has proven it will ruthlessly suppress dissent.
Some Kurdish organizations are preparing civilians for potential escalation. The Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) urged residents in western Iran to build neighborhood and village structures in case the region descends into prolonged conflict. But Voß warns that Kurdish military capacity is limited: even with external arms, small irregular units would face Iran’s deeply entrenched and organized security apparatus, shaped by decades of counterrevolutionary preparedness.
A Kurdish advance would also risk inflaming internal tensions within Iran’s multiethnic society. Voß cautions that external military support for one ethnic group could stoke internal conflicts and alienate many Iranians outside Kurdish regions. Iranian media increasingly portray Kurdish groups as existential threats to the state—an exaggeration, Habibi says—but Tehran could exploit such narratives to mobilize other ethnic or religious groups against the Kurds.
Regionally, a strengthened Kurdish presence would have repercussions. Turkey, which is already fighting Kurdish groups at home and across its borders, would strongly oppose any empowerment of Kurdish forces in the area; President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would likely act to prevent a durable Kurdish foothold. Kurdish communities also remember being abandoned by international partners in past crises, which fuels skepticism about outside commitments.
For analysts, the core question is less whether Kurds will rise than what the consequences would be. A Kurdish military push might yield short-term tactical gains, but it carries significant risks of long-term instability and offers limited strategic depth. Most regional actors have little interest in a fully chaotic Iran, and a broader breakdown could produce unpredictable and damaging effects across the region.
This piece was originally written in German.