The risk of nuclear escalation in the Middle East has grown since the conflict that began in late February, when US and Israeli strikes hit targets in Iran. Attacks on nuclear-related sites in both Iran and Israel have heightened fears of a wider confrontation and raised questions about regional proliferation.
President Donald Trump presented the campaign as intended to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Many analysts caution, however, that kinetic pressure of this kind can backfire: rather than deterring states, it can accelerate their drive toward nuclear options as the surest form of security.
Nuclear weapons are usually seen as powerful deterrents. Examples frequently cited include North Korea, where a nuclear arsenal is widely understood to complicate any direct intervention, and Ukraine, which gave up the third-largest nuclear stockpile in 1994 only to find that later Russian aggression has been read as a warning about the limits of security assurances. Those contrasts inform how regional governments now think about survival and coercion.
Before the fighting, Iran was often described as being in a state of “nuclear latency”—possessing much of the technical capacity to build a weapon without having chosen to do so. Some analysts argue Tehran used ambiguity to reduce the chance of pre-emptive attacks; others warn that recent strikes and related political pressures may have turned latent capabilities into a grievance that increases incentives to pursue more overt weaponization. Iranian officials have raised the possibility of withdrawing from the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a move that would mark a major shift in legal and political commitments.
Changes in regional security dynamics could prompt other Middle Eastern states to reevaluate their nuclear postures. Gulf governments, feeling squeezed between Iran and Israel and uncertain about the reliability of US security guarantees, are among those most likely to consider new options. Arms Control Association analyst Kelsey Davenport has suggested that this environment will push some Gulf capitals closer to considering nuclear weapons, although a rapid “dash for the bomb” remains unlikely because of substantial technical, political and logistical obstacles.
Saudi Arabia has already signaled interest in nuclear latency. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has said publicly that if Iran obtained a bomb, Saudi Arabia would need one too. After a US visit in late 2025, Riyadh reportedly secured a nuclear cooperation agreement that could allow uranium enrichment, a step that would require congressional approval in Washington. Many US nuclear agreements include the IAEA’s “additional protocol,” which grants broader inspection powers; reports indicate the Saudi arrangement might rely on more limited bilateral safeguards, raising proliferation concerns. A former IAEA official has argued that such flexibility could undercut the very rationale offered for striking Iran to prevent enrichment.
Even with political momentum, weaponizing a nuclear program would take many years. Analysts estimate a decade or more to build the necessary nuclear infrastructure and longer to produce deliverable weapons, while shortages of trained technical personnel and industrial capacity are significant constraints. For now, Saudi priorities appear to emphasize civilian nuclear energy, strategic prestige and hedging rather than immediate weaponization.
The United Arab Emirates offers a contrasting model. The UAE’s Barakah nuclear power plant was developed under a 2009 deal with the US that included the additional protocol and an agreement to forgo enrichment. That pact also contains a most-favored-nation clause that could prompt renegotiation if neighboring states gain looser terms, a dynamic that might create political pressure if Gulf peers secure different arrangements.
Other potential candidates for increased nuclear latency include Egypt and Turkey. Egypt is building a Russian-supported reactor but faces financial and political hurdles that make a weapons program unlikely in the near term. Turkey is expanding civilian nuclear ties with Russia and China and strengthening its defense industry, but as a NATO member it also benefits from alliance security guarantees that lower the immediate incentive to pursue nuclear arms.
At the global level, China and Russia have strategic reasons to prevent a wholesale collapse of the non-proliferation regime, not least because new proliferators would complicate their own security calculations in regions such as East Asia. While Moscow and Beijing might provide materials or technology that support civilian nuclear programs, experts generally judge them unlikely to openly assist weaponization. Still, geopolitical divisions between Western powers and Russia/China could be exploited by regional actors seeking to reduce diplomatic costs if they move closer to the nuclear threshold.
Stopping broader proliferation in a post-conflict Middle East will be challenging. Most analysts point to regional security dialogue, renewed diplomacy, confidence-building measures and cooperative security frameworks as the most realistic ways to reduce incentives for nuclear armament. Without credible security alternatives, governments may conclude that nuclear deterrence is the only reliable protection against hostile neighbors or future strikes.
In sum, the war has raised the probability that Middle Eastern states will reassess their civil and military nuclear choices. Significant technical, political and temporal barriers make an immediate arms race unlikely, but shifting threat perceptions, contentious nuclear agreements, and weakened alliances increase the long-term risk of expanded nuclear latency and eventual proliferation.