Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin’s vaunted “no-limits” partnership with China has grown increasingly one-sided. Trade flows and financial arrangements that once looked like mutual cooperation now leave Moscow structurally dependent on Beijing.
Energy and trade
China has bought vast quantities of discounted Russian fossil fuels, keeping Russian export revenues flowing despite Western sanctions. In 2024 Russia exported roughly $129 billion in goods to China, dominated by crude oil, coal and natural gas offered at deep price concessions. Research groups estimate China has purchased more than €319 billion ($372 billion) of Russian fossil fuels since the conflict began — money that has helped Moscow finance its war effort as Western markets closed.
At the same time, China sent nearly $116 billion in goods to Russia in 2024, supplying machinery, electronics and vehicles that largely replaced Western suppliers forced out by sanctions. Beijing has stopped short of openly delivering finished weapons systems, but it has exported large volumes of dual-use items — civilian technologies that have military applications — sustaining key parts of Russia’s defense-industrial base.
Technology and sanctions evasion
Western export controls have cut off Russia from advanced semiconductors, precision machine tools and other technologies needed for high-end weapons production. As a result, Moscow has turned to China and to complex procurement chains that route goods through third countries. Bloomberg and other analysts report that Chinese suppliers accounted for roughly 90% of Russia’s sanctioned technology imports in 2025, up from about 80% the year before.
Sourcing parts and machine tools has become harder and far more expensive. Russian buyers often pay large premiums — in some cases approaching 90% above pre-war prices — to obtain equipment through covert networks. Chinese-sourced satellite imagery, earth-observation data and drones have also been reported to assist Russian military operations, helping Moscow maintain and expand production of missiles, drones and related systems.
Finance and yuanization
Financial pressure has been a central element of Western policy: major Russian banks were cut off from SWIFT and roughly $300 billion of Russia’s central-bank reserves were frozen abroad. That threat to dollar and euro transactions pushed Moscow and Beijing to accelerate de-dollarization. By late last year, Russian officials said over 99% of bilateral trade between the two countries was being settled in rubles and yuan.
Shifting trade into local currencies reduces exposure to Western financial controls but creates new problems. Russia has faced occasional yuan shortages, higher borrowing costs and a growing need to accept Chinese terms in commercial negotiations. Wider use of the yuan also strengthens China’s global economic influence: countries that hold or borrow in yuan become more economically tied to Beijing.
Geopolitics and energy leverage
China’s appetite for overland energy supplies makes Russia’s hydrocarbon exports strategically important. Moscow is pushing to expand pipeline capacity to China — including progress on the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which could carry up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas a year via Mongolia if pricing and technical disputes are resolved. Increased pipeline links would boost Chinese energy security, including in scenarios where maritime routes could be disrupted.
Analysts warn that expanding energy ties would deepen Russia’s dependence on China and increase Beijing’s leverage over Moscow in future negotiations. The timing of high-level visits and anniversaries of bilateral treaties underscores how the two governments are trying to lock in long-term cooperation while the balance of benefits shifts toward China.
Outlook
Most observers expect Beijing’s leverage to keep growing. A partial thaw in US-China relations would not necessarily help Moscow: closer US-China ties reduce Beijing’s incentive to fully align with Russia, since China prioritizes protecting its vast trade and financial ties with the West.
The upshot is a strategic asymmetry: Russia still needs Chinese markets, capital and technology much more than China needs Russian exports. That imbalance gives Beijing economic tools and diplomatic flexibility to press its priorities, leaving Moscow more vulnerable to Chinese influence even as it publicly celebrates a “no-limits” partnership.