International assessments repeatedly describe the same trend in Serbia: a shrinking space for independent journalism and a growing, increasingly sophisticated network of pro-government outlets. Reports cite “backsliding,” mounting pressure and political interference in editorial decisions.
Journalist and analyst Nedim Sejdinovic argues that after the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) assumed national power in 2012, it pursued a deliberate strategy to bring the media under its influence. The approach was systematic: media that cooperated with the authorities received financial and institutional backing, while outlets that resisted were marginalized economically and politically.
One of the early moves was reshaping the public broadcaster in the Vojvodina region—management, editors and presenters were replaced once SNS secured regional control. Local outlets were often acquired by people linked to the ruling elite, including relatives of ministers and business associates. Sejdinovic estimates that roughly 90% of outlets are directly or indirectly connected to President Aleksandar Vucic’s circle.
Public funding has been a central instrument in maintaining pro-government media. Project co-financing—public money distributed through competitive calls for content framed as serving the public interest—has channelled substantial sums to outlets friendly to the authorities. Watchdog analyses by BIRN and the Center for Sustainable Communities put the total at around €120 million over the past decade, with much of it favoring pro-government outlets.
State advertising is a second, larger and less transparent source of support, and evidence indicates it is disproportionately allocated to loyal outlets. A third mechanism is market pressure: in a political and economic environment where ties to the authorities matter, private companies often avoid advertising in independent media to protect their interests, starving critical outlets of revenue.
These pressures have blurred journalism and propaganda. Critical reporting is delegitimized, scandals are reframed to fit official narratives, and dissenting voices are sidelined or smeared—labeled as “traitors,” “foreign mercenaries” or “enemies of the state.” President Vucic dominates broadcast airtime; his speeches are frequently aired live across networks, producing a uniform message on multiple channels. In 2017 almost all daily papers carried front-page adverts for then-Prime Minister Vucic, an unprecedented level of visibility for a single political figure.
As political tensions have risen, especially amid protests over the past 18 months, Sejdinovic says control has hardened further. Early loyalist outlets that once limited themselves to favorable coverage are being supplanted by what he calls “super-loyalists”: outlets that act as blunt political weapons—spreading falsehoods, defaming opponents, and using aggressive rhetoric that deepens social divides.
This model is expanded by a wave of newly registered outlets. The Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM) reported dozens of new registrations since early 2026; ANEM’s Bojan Cvejic describes many of these as propaganda machines that republish near-identical, unsigned pieces intended to attack critics rather than provide reporting.
Reporters Without Borders ranks Serbia 104th in its World Press Freedom Index, categorizing the situation as “difficult.” Observers fear the campaign of control could intensify if parliamentary elections are called later this year, potentially extending pressure into the digital sphere. Analysts such as Sejdinovic conclude that media freedom in Serbia today is primarily a political problem that, without a change in government, will be difficult to remedy.