Iran’s engagement with Africa is long-standing and multifaceted, stretching from historic ties to modern partnerships built under the last shah and sustained after the 1979 revolution. Tehran pursues economic, strategic, military, religious and academic links across the continent while working to skirt international sanctions. In 2025 Iranian exports to Africa jumped sharply—roughly 85 percent higher than in 2024—and the country hosts many African students, develops technology and cultural partnerships, and contributes to health and humanitarian programs.
The wider conflict between the US, Israel and Iran is hitting African economies at a fragile moment. Disruptions to maritime routes have pushed ships to avoid the Suez Canal and sail around the Cape of Good Hope, lengthening voyages, raising shipping costs and feeding into higher consumer prices. In Nigeria, for example, gas prices reportedly rose about 11 percent in a single week. Analysts also warn of spillover effects on African migrant workers in the Gulf—more than 400,000 Kenyans alone work there—whose incomes and remittances could be threatened if regional instability persists.
Tehran’s presence in Africa is still smaller than that of major Western powers, but it is active and expanding. Iran maintains diplomatic missions in 22 African countries and regularly convenes Iran–Africa forums. As Western influence has waned in parts of the Sahel—particularly after France reduced its role—Tehran has sought to deepen ties with the Alliance of Sahel States, including Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. High-level exchanges have occurred: Burkina Faso’s defense minister visited Tehran, and Niger’s prime minister traveled to Iran in early 2024.
Natural resources and energy are a key focus. Niger is a significant uranium producer, and reports have alleged Iranian attempts to buy large quantities of Nigerien uranium after Niger’s 2023 coup. A 2024 Africa Defense Forum article reported approaches to purchase some 300 tons of uranium, a move that raised concerns about sanctions-busting and nuclear proliferation. Journalists and regional analysts, however, say there is no confirmed evidence of large-scale uranium transfers, and Iran maintains its nuclear activities are civilian.
Military and technological ties are also expanding. Several Sahelian governments have acquired Iranian-made drones amid rising insecurity and demand for surveillance and strike capabilities. While many African buyers obtain drones from Turkey, Iran’s drone industry is increasingly competitive for states confronting terrorism. Observers caution the ongoing war could temporarily slow some Iran–Africa cooperation as Tehran redirects political, military and diplomatic resources to the Middle East.
Religious and cultural outreach provides another avenue of influence. Iran leverages institutions, scholarships and local Shiite networks in parts of West and East Africa. Significant Shiite communities exist in areas of Guinea, Senegal, Niger and Nigeria, and Sunni–Shiite competition—often framed alongside rivalry with Saudi Arabia—plays out through cultural and clerical ties. Some African clerics with connections to Tehran have publicly voiced support for Iranian leaders, reflecting diverse local responses.
In sum, the immediate economic impacts on Africa—higher transport and fuel costs and risks to migrant incomes—are clear. But whether Iran’s growing diplomatic, military and cultural ties will reshape regional alignments, resource politics or security dynamics over the longer term remains uncertain. Outcomes will depend on how the conflict evolves, how African governments balance competing external partners, and whether reported resource deals materialize.