On April 12, Hungary will hold what many regard as the most consequential parliamentary election since the fall of communism in 1989–90. The central question is whether Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party can be removed after more than a decade in power. For the first time since 2010 the opposition — led by Peter Magyar’s conservative Tisza party — appears to have a real chance of winning.
The stakes extend beyond Hungary’s borders. The result will shape the country’s domestic trajectory and affect European Union cohesion and the extent of Russian influence inside the bloc.
How Orbán reshaped Hungary
After securing a two‑thirds majority in 2010, Orbán created what he calls the System of National Cooperation (NER). He replaced senior figures across the judiciary, civil service, public administration and state institutions with loyalists, concentrating power in the executive. Checks and balances were weakened, much of the media came under government‑aligned control via friendly companies and foundations, university autonomy was curtailed, and major state assets were shifted into foundations linked to Fidesz. Many analysts describe Hungary as a hybrid regime — situated between a liberal democracy and authoritarian rule.
Why many Hungarians want change
While Orbán’s tax and economic measures have bolstered his core upper‑middle‑class support, many citizens say they have seen declining public services, deteriorating infrastructure, strained healthcare and education systems, and stagnating or falling living standards. Widespread frustration over perceived corruption and the apparent enrichment of officials has fueled public anger. Political life is highly polarized: critics are frequently denounced as traitors, and Orbán’s framing of the Russia–Ukraine war, including hostile rhetoric toward Ukraine, has deepened social divisions.
European implications
Orbán has repeatedly pushed to reshape the EU into a looser confederation of sovereign states and often clashes with Brussels. He has used vetoes and procedural blocks to stall EU foreign‑policy initiatives, sometimes paralyzing collective responses. A further Orbán term would likely prolong tensions and weaken EU unity; his defeat could strengthen Brussels’ ability to act cohesively.
What the election means for Russia
No EU member state maintains closer political ties with Moscow than Orbán’s Hungary. Although Budapest supported many sanctions after 2014, since Russia’s 2022 invasion Orbán has sought exemptions, pushed to lift measures and impeded some support for Ukraine. Those moves dovetail with Russian interests in undermining EU unity; an Orbán loss would be a diplomatic setback for Moscow.
Is it realistically possible to remove Orbán?
Fidesz engineered electoral reforms that favor its prospects, boosting the role of single‑member districts: 106 of the 199 parliamentary seats are decided by first‑past‑the‑post contests. Constituency boundaries and population sizes have been arranged so that many districts favorable to Fidesz require fewer votes to win. In 2022 Fidesz won roughly 53% of the vote but took about 68% of parliamentary seats. Ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries who hold Hungarian citizenship can cast absentee ballots for party lists, potentially adding a seat or two for Fidesz; Hungarians living in many Western European countries can vote only at embassies and consulates. Experts say the rules are skewed but most do not anticipate widespread ballot rigging; isolated postal‑vote fraud remains a concern. Change is difficult but not impossible.
Polls and their limits
Independent polls over the past year have generally shown the Tisza party ahead of Fidesz, at times by a clear margin. But national polling masks constituency‑level dynamics. Fidesz’s core electorate — older voters and retirees in small towns and villages — can be undercounted in some surveys, so national projections could be misleading. Still, a substantial number of analysts expect Orbán to face defeat.
What Peter Magyar promises
Peter Magyar proposes to bring Hungary closer to the EU and NATO and to distance Budapest from Russia, while preserving elements of current policies on migration and Ukraine to avoid a direct clash with Brussels. Domestically he vows to combat corruption and roll out systemic reforms: a fairer electoral system, a two‑term limit for the prime minister, and a new constitution. Magyar has also said high‑ranking Orbán associates could face investigations into corruption or high treason.
Would Orbán accept defeat?
Orbán has not given a clear, unconditional pledge to accept an electoral loss. He points out he has both won and lost elections and insists Hungary is a democracy. If he were to contest the result, the potential for mass protests — and possibly violent clashes — is real, given the high levels of public anger. Whether his supporters would mobilize en masse depends largely on how he responds to defeat.
Can the Orbán system be dismantled?
Orbán has insulated his power with many measures that require a two‑thirds parliamentary majority to reverse and by placing loyalists in long‑term positions across state institutions. A new government with only a simple majority could meet significant resistance from entrenched bodies and officials. Even with a supermajority, rolling back the institutional changes and personnel networks created over more than a decade would be complex and could take years.
The outcome on April 12 will determine whether Hungary begins a rapid reorientation toward Brussels and away from Moscow or continues along the path laid down by Orbán’s decade‑long dominance. The balance of domestic grievances, electoral mechanics and political will will decide whether change is both possible and sustainable.
The original article was translated from German.