The political situation in the Horn of Africa is dominated by tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has signaled he no longer accepts viewing Ethiopia as landlocked, saying it is “not feasible at any time” to continue doing so.
Ethiopia lost access to the Red Sea when Eritrea gained independence in 1993 after decades of war. An initial arrangement let Ethiopia import goods duty-free through the Eritrean port of Assab, but a renewed border conflict in the late 1990s ended that. Today much of Ethiopia’s trade passes through Djibouti, a costly dependence for the landlocked nation.
Resistance to Ethiopian expansion
Abiy wants to reduce dependence on foreign ports and secure direct control of seaport access, according to analyst Abdurahman Sayed. While access via Djibouti and Somalia is already possible, Abiy seeks direct Ethiopian control—an objective coastal states resist. The 2018 peace agreement with Eritrea could have provided a pathway to sustained access; that rapprochement earned Abiy the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Now, however, signs point again toward confrontation with Eritrea.
Sayed suggests Ethiopia’s push is “heavily driven by external interests outside the Horn of Africa,” chiefly the United Arab Emirates. But the UAE is under growing pressure from conflicts in the Persian Gulf and tensions involving Iran, and may be forced to reduce its presence in the Horn to focus on regional problems—meaning Ethiopia could expect less external support in any conflict with Eritrea.
Ethiopia has publicly demanded a separate seaport since 2023, and rhetoric on the issue has intensified. Earlier this year, reports said Ethiopian government soldiers and fighters from Tigray had been positioned along the roughly 1,000-kilometer border with Eritrea. So far, these tensions have not erupted into open war.
Ethiopia’s partners under pressure
Analyst Guido Lanfranchi notes that tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been high for over a year. He says the immediate danger of war appears to have eased in part because broader regional issues—such as fuel shortages linked to the crisis involving Iran—have made large-scale military operations more difficult. However, he cautions that the international community should not reduce attention to the crisis because the underlying causes of the rivalry remain.
Threat of civil war in Ethiopia lingers
Amanuel Dessalegn Gedebo points out that Eritrea itself has limited interest in direct conflict given its weaker economic and military position. Instead, Eritrea has used indirect maneuvers: strengthening ties with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), offering support to armed groups such as the Amhara militia Fano, and deepening ties with Ethiopia’s regional adversaries, notably Egypt.
The conflict in Tigray remains central to Ethiopia’s instability. Although a two-year civil war in the northern region formally ended with an agreement in November 2022, Tigray continues to be governed by an interim administration appointed by Addis Ababa—its mandate extended again in April despite TPLF criticism. In response, the TPLF announced the reinstatement of a regional parliament; holding regional elections was one of the triggers of the earlier war. Observers warn that armed conflict between the federal government and regional forces could flare up again.
Economic pressures—fuel shortages and rising transport and food costs tied to disruptions in oil-producing regions—have worsened Ethiopia’s fragile economy and made a new large-scale military operation currently unfeasible. Analysts describe the present lull as a postponement rather than a resolution.
War not inevitable in Ethiopia
Gerrit Kurtz of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) argues that while external and geopolitical factors exacerbate Ethiopia’s crisis, the country’s multiethnic politics cannot be reduced to foreign interests alone. An escalation would occur if Tigray were to establish a rival government, but war is not inevitable; both sides are maneuvering for dominance. The extent of Eritrean support for any renewed conflict remains uncertain.
Domestic politics also factor in. Parliamentary elections scheduled for June 1 are important for Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party to secure legitimacy. Lanfranchi says the opposition has little chance, and from Abiy’s perspective it makes little sense to postpone elections ahead of a military operation.
Video: Why can’t Ethiopia and Eritrea be friends?
This article was originally written in German.
Correction, April 24, 2026: An earlier version misspelled the names of Amanuel Dessalegn Gedebo and Abdurahman Sayed. DW apologizes for the error.