Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have returned to the center of politics in the Horn of Africa as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rejects the idea of Ethiopia remaining landlocked. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia lost direct access to the Red Sea; a post-independence arrangement allowed duty-free use of the Eritrean port of Assab but collapsed after border fighting in the late 1990s. Today most Ethiopian trade flows through Djibouti, a dependence that is costly and politically sensitive.
Abiy has publicly pushed for guaranteed seaport access under Ethiopian control, arguing that reliance on foreign ports is unsustainable. While Ethiopia already can use ports in Djibouti and Somalia, the government seeks direct control of a coastline—an ambition that coastal neighbors resist. The 2018 peace rapprochement with Eritrea raised hopes that access might be normalized; that détente earned Abiy the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. But in recent months rhetoric and troop movements have suggested a renewed risk of confrontation.
Outside actors also play a role. Some analysts say external interests, notably the United Arab Emirates, have supported initiatives related to ports and influence in the Horn. The UAE, however, is facing greater regional pressures that could limit its role, leaving Ethiopia with less potential external backing in any clash with Eritrea.
Since 2023 Addis Ababa has publicly demanded a separate seaport. Reports earlier this year said Ethiopian government forces, together with fighters from the Tigray region, were positioned along the roughly 1,000-kilometer border with Eritrea. So far these deployments have not led to open war, but they have raised alarm across the region.
Analysts assessing the immediate risk of war point to several restraining factors. Fuel shortages and related disruptions—exacerbated by wider tensions in the Persian Gulf and problems affecting oil-producing routes—have tightened military logistics and raised costs, making large-scale operations harder to mount. That, together with economic strain in Ethiopia, has reduced the likelihood of an imminent all-out war, at least for now. Observers caution, however, that this lull is a postponement rather than a solution: the underlying political and territorial disputes remain unresolved.
Eritrea’s calculus is important. Some experts note that Eritrea’s own economic and military limitations make it less likely to start a direct, sustained invasion. Instead, Eritrea appears to pursue indirect strategies: deepening ties with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), supporting armed Amhara groups such as Fano, and cultivating relationships with regional rivals of Addis Ababa, including Egypt. These alignments complicate Ethiopia’s internal politics and increase the risk of proxy or hybrid conflict.
The Tigray question remains central to Ethiopia’s instability. The two-year war in Tigray formally ended with an agreement in November 2022, but federal authorities continue to administer the region through an interim administration whose mandate has been extended despite TPLF objections. The TPLF has reacted by reinstating a regional parliament and taking steps that recall the political triggers of the earlier conflict. Many observers warn that a renewed clash between federal forces and regional actors would rapidly escalate domestic instability and could draw in neighboring states.
Domestic politics are also a driving force. Parliamentary elections scheduled for June are viewed as crucial for the legitimacy of Abiy’s Prosperity Party. Analysts argue the opposition stands little chance of victory, and from the government’s perspective it makes limited sense to postpone elections in anticipation of a military campaign. That political timetable pushes leaders toward demonstrating control rather than opening a new large-scale war.
In short, while the risk of armed confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea has increased—fueled by competing ambitions over access to the sea, shifting regional alliances, and unresolved domestic fractures—war is not inevitable. External pressures, economic limits, and complex internal rivalries are simultaneously restraining and aggravating the crisis. The international community and regional actors, analysts say, should maintain attention: current constraints may delay conflict but do not remove the underlying sources of confrontation.
Correction: Names of Amanuel Dessalegn Gedebo and Abdurahman Sayed were previously misspelled; this has been corrected.